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Abstract
This thesis explores the viability of using Internet Protocol (IP) address hopping
in front of a network as a defensive measure. Network address space randomization
techniques theoretically provide protection to a network by appearing to randomly change
the addresses of hosts inside, presenting a challenge to an intruder attempting to break in
and map the network. This research presents a custom gateway-based IP hopping solution
called Address Routing Gateway (ARG) that combines previous work in this area.
ARG works as a transparent gateway in front of a network, requiring no changes to the
hosts inside or out. Each ARG gateway is configured with a small amount of knowledge
on one or more other gateways, allowing them to connect and pass fully encrypted and
authenticated traffic amongst themselves. Connections to non-ARG networks or hosts
are handled gracefully, allowing long-lived connections to exist without terminating them
during IP address changes. This thesis tests the overall stability of ARG, the accuracy of
its classifications, the maximum throughput it can support, and the maximum rate at which
it can change IPs and still communicate reliably.
This research is accomplished on a physical test network with nodes representing the
types of hosts found on a typical, corporate-style network. Direct measurement is used to
obtain all results for each factor level. Tests demonstrate ARG classifies traffic correctly,
with no false negatives and less than a 0.15% false positive rate on average. The test
environment conservatively shows this to be true as long as the IP address change interval
exceeds two times the network’s round-trip latency; real-world deployments may allow for
more frequent hopping. Results show ARG capably handles traffic of at least four megabits
per second with no impact on packet loss. Fuzz testing validates the stability of ARG itself,
although additional packet loss of around 23% appears when under attack.
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EVALUATING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF IP HOPPING VIA AN ADDRESS
ROUTING GATEWAY
I. Introduction
1.1 Motivation
Traditional network defenses consist of largely static tools. Firewalls and Intrusion
Detection Systems (IDSs) form the backbone of protection in most information technology
shops. Despite extensive work and research into these systems, attackers still routinely
break into networks and bring down critical systems, exfiltrate data, and establish footholds
for future actions. In an effort to combat this, interest has increased in more active defense
mechanisms, such as reputation and trust-based security [NV09] and Network Address
Space Randomization (NASR) [APWJ03, SSH05]. This thesis focuses on the latter in a
large corporate network setting.
At a high level, the concept of NASR is simple: rather than a system sitting on a
single Internet Protocol (IP) address, it changes addresses rapidly, hopping amongst a set
of IP addresses assigned to it. Normally an attacker wishing to target a given network
is capable of gaining intelligence through simple scanning, checking each IP inside the
network and then checking each port on the active IPs to see what services are available.
With this knowledge, the attacker can often find an entrance into the network. IP hopping
mitigates this issue by making it difficult to probe the network in the first place and quickly
invalidating any network map that the attacker does manage to generate; even if they do
manage to look a system’s internal IP at one point in time, the address will change moments
later.
1
1.2 Goals and Limitations
This thesis proposes an IP address hopping system called Address Routing Gateway
(ARG). It incorporates many of the features of previous address-hopping schemes, with
an eye on the specific needs of the military and any other large, geographically diverse
corporation. In this context each of the existing systems presents drawbacks that ARG
attempts to avoid. Additionally, the design of ARG is intended to allow its future integration
with a traditional IDS and honeypot, potentially gaining additional insight into an attacker’s
behavior.
The geographically diverse military network demands high availability, reliability, and
security over any network. Additionally, ARG must support transport over the commercial
Internet. In light of these and other requirements, this thesis examines several questions
with regards to IP hopping and ARG.
• Does ARG classify traffic correctly? What percentage of false positives (valid
packets blocked) and false negatives (invalid traffic allowed through) does it
introduce?
• What is the maximum packet rate ARG can support?
• What is the minimum hop interval—the time between ARG’s IP changes—that is
supportable? How does latency affect this?
• Is ARG stable when presented with corrupt, malformed, and/or replayed packets?
Each question is tested in a separate series of experiments. Direct measurement on a
physical network is used for all results. Nodes on the test network represent the types of
hosts found on a typical, corporate-style network. These include trusted hosts inside trusted
networks which communicate freely, internal and external servers that must be accessible
to hosts inside these trusted networks, and malicious hosts outside the networks. ARG sits
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in front of the trusted networks and provides network address space randomization to the
internal hosts.
1.3 Thesis Overview
This chapter introduces the research, goals, and limitations of the work in this thesis.
Chapter 2 covers foundational background topics, concepts, and research. Chapter 3
discusses the design of ARG, including design requirements, architecture, and the network
protocol. Chapter 4 walks through the test methodology used in this thesis, while Chapter
5 presents results and analysis of these tests. Finally, Chapter 6 provides a concluding
discussion of this research and presents possible areas of future work.
3
II. Background
This chapter provides an introduction to the technology behind IP hopping and many
of the previous efforts in this area. Section 2.1 describes how routing works at various
points in a network. Section 2.2 covers IP address space randomization—referred to
as “IP hopping” in this thesis—and two possible approaches. Sections 2.3 and 2.4
provide descriptions of two critical systems behind the implementation this thesis presents,
encryption and Time-Based One-Time Password (TOTP). Finally, Section 2.5 examines
previous efforts in IP address hopping.
2.1 Network Routing
2.1.1 IP Routing.
This thesis assumes that the reader has a familiarity with how IP works. However,
several aspects of this protocol are critical to the functioning of the system described later
and are detailed here.
IP packets are routed from system to system based on the destination IP address
contained in their header. Appendix A displays the format for both IP version 4 (IPv4)
and IP version 6 (IPv6) packets. IPv4 uses 32-bit addresses to uniquely identify each
system on the public Internet. These addresses are typically represented in a “dotted quad”
format: for example, 74.125.228.36. IPv6 uses 128-bit address, typically represented in
hexadecimal and separated by colons, along the lines of fe80::baf6:b1ff:fe1b:b4a1.
Regardless of which version is in use, high-level routing remains conceptually the
same. Routers maintain a table of IP addresses, masks, and the interfaces associated with
each. When a packet is received, the router consults this table and decides what interface
to send the packet out on based on the most specific entry. For example, in the network
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shown in Figure 2.1, the laptop with IP 10.5.0.25 wants to send a packet to 172.100.10.3.
When 10.5.0.25 sends its packet, the following sequence of events occurs:
A
C
B
Port 2
Port 1
Port 3
10.5.0.25
172.100.0.3
172.100.10.3
172.100.10.5
Figure 2.1: IP routing example network
1. The packet leaves 10.5.0.25 and Router A receives it on its interface Port 1.
2. Router A compares the packet’s destination IP (172.100.10.3) to its table, which looks
like Table 2.1.
Table 2.1: IP routing example: Router A table
IP Mask Interface
1 10.5.0.25 255.255.0.0 Port 1
2 172.100.10.0 255.255.255.0 Port 2
3 172.100.0.0 255.255.0.0 Port 3
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3. Router A determines the IP matches best with entry 2, which instructs the router to
forward the packet via Port 2.
4. Router B receives the packet and does a similar lookup, forwarding it out on the port to
172.100.10.3.
5. 172.100.10.3 receives the packet.
This scheme allows a router to direct packets without having to know every individual
IP; they only need to know broad address ranges. In the example, Router A possesses
no knowledge of how to get the packet directly to 172.100.10.3, but it does know which
direction to send it. This becomes exponentially more useful on larger networks. A
corporation’s network, for instance, may contain hundreds or thousands of addresses, but
the routers directing packets to them need only have one entry in their table to correctly
route packets. The internal routers of the corporation are then in charge of further routing.
This limited-knowledge architecture allows IP hopping to work. As long as the tables
of the routers outside the network contain the correct IP ranges, the systems inside are free
to change addresses as frequently as they want and handle internal routing any way they
desire.
2.1.2 Network Address Translation.
Network Address Translation (NAT) is a core technology behind many modern home
and corporate networks, allowing many systems to connect to the Internet yet appear to
come from a single external IP address. A typical home network, for instance, might have
the external IP address 184.58.31.151 assigned to it by their Internet Service Provider (ISP)
yet have five systems—laptops, desktops, phones—inside with IPs like 192.168.0.103,
192.168.0.50, and 192.168.0.1. As these systems send requests out, the router changes
the source IP (and port) for packets to the external IP address. As responses come back
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from the Internet, the router does the opposite, changing the destination of the packets
from the external IP to the internal IP of the original requester.
To do this, routers must maintain a NAT table. This table consists of the source and
destination information as well as a new port number, allowing the router to consistently
transform traffic in both directions. For example, a router might have a table like the one
shown in Table 2.2.
Table 2.2: NAT table example
Int IP Int Port Remote IP Remote Port Ext Port
1 192.168.0.103 3547 74.125.225.69 443 50003
2 192.168.0.103 8751 207.109.73.34 80 42630
3 192.168.0.112 30452 4.27.2.253 80 53920
This small table shows three different connections in progress. The router created each
entry the first time an internal system sent a packet to the remote (Internet) system, for each
set of internal and remote IPs and ports. In addition, the router assigns an external port for
each connection to allow it to determine the destination of incoming packets.
In the future, when the router receives an outgoing packet (from the internal host to
the external), it begins by consulting its table to find a match based on the first four values
in the table. Based on the table entry, the router changes the source IP of the packet to the
external IP assigned to it by the ISP and the source port to the external port given in the
table (if it does not find one, it creates a new one). When the router receives a packet from
the Internet, it checks for a match in the table based on the remote IP, remote port, and
external port. If it finds one, it alters the packet’s destination information to the internal IP
and port; if it does not find a match, it drops the packet.
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This system serves two purposes. First, as the number of systems on the Internet has
increased, IPv4 addresses have become a limited resource, with their 32-bit length limiting
the number of possible addresses to around four billion. NAT allows an organization to
only own a single address yet serve many systems behind it. Second, NAT inherently acts
as a simple stateful firewall [ARMT06]. In order for an outside system to send packets to
an internal host, the internal host must initiate the connection, allowing the router to create
the table entry.
2.1.3 Ethernet and Address Resolution Protocol (ARP).
Many local networks use Ethernet for the first and last leg of network travel to actual
hosts. In a flat network, where local machines are connected together via switches or hubs,
IP routing is not typically used. Instead, packets are directed to the correct recipient via
physical identifiers known as Media Access Control (MAC) addresses. Packets sent on an
Ethernet network are wrapped in an Ethernet frame, which specifies the MAC addresses of
the sender and receiver.
When a packet is first created, however, the host system only knows the destination IP.
Before the packet can be sent out, the sender must determine the destination MAC address.
This is done through an ARP request, a process illustrated in Figure 2.2.
As shown, the sender first asks on the network who has the destination IP. Every host
on the network (typically) hears the request, but only the host with that IP responds, sending
back an ARP response with their MAC address to the requester. With the destination MAC
now in hand, the original sender can construct the Ethernet frame for their IP packet and
send the data on its way. The sender caches the physical address of the other machine for a
short time to avoid repeating the ARP request too frequently.
To send packets beyond the local network, hosts use a gateway system, usually a
router. They transfer the packet to the gateway via Ethernet, then the gateway directs the
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DestinationSender
ARP Request
Who has 192.168.0.5?
Tell aa:aa:dd:ff:bb:ee
ARP Response
192.168.0.5 is at
bb:bb:cc:dd:ee:ff
Ethernet Frame
Src: aa:aa:dd:ff:bb:ee
Dest: bb:bb:cc:dd:ee:ff
Ti
m
e
Figure 2.2: ARP exchange example
packet further. Ethernet and ARP are not used directly by local hosts to reach hosts beyond
the gateway.
2.2 IP Hopping in Detail
Address hopping is a simple concept at a high level: take the basic identifiers of a
network and mutate them in a way that only authorized systems understand and continue
to use for communication. In this thesis, hopping focuses on changing the IP addresses
the “hopping” systems use. In some ways this is similar to frequency hopping, where
senders and receivers change the frequency in use in a synchronized manner to avoid
interference, jamming, and eavesdropping [MKR+04]. In the same way, changing the
IP addresses of packets makes it difficult for an adversary to correlate sniffed traffic with
individual machines and even more difficult to probe into the network to enumerate hosts.
Other methods of dynamic network reconfiguration exist, but address hopping may have
the greatest potential for obstructing network reconnaissance efforts [Rep08].
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In trying to actually implement such a system, however, several issues arise. The
network Figure 2.3 illustrates is used to aid the following discussion. There are two main
networks A and B that wish to communicate freely. They are connected via the Internet
and are assigned the displayed IP ranges. Each of these has a few friendly end nodes (A1,
A2, B1, etc.) behind a main router (AR and BR). Additionally, network B has a potentially
rogue client inside it named M1. Outside of those two networks is the friendly C1 node,
who has an interest in at least occasionally communicating with nodes inside networks A
and B, and malicious M2, who wants access to said networks. The details of the routes
between them and A and B are inconsequential.
Note that for the sake of this discussion non-routable IPv4 addresses are used. This
is done merely for convenience and readability, everything applies to IPv6 as well unless
otherwise noted.
C1
M2
A1
A2
B1
M1
B2
AR
10.1.1.0/24
BR
10.2.2.0/24
Internet
Figure 2.3: IP hopping example network layout. Red nodes are malicious.
There are two basic ways to deploy IP address hopping on this network: each end
point hops individually or the network gateways transform incoming and outgoing packets.
Both options and their strengths and weaknesses are discussed.
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2.2.1 End Point Hopping.
For the example network, end point hopping means that all nodes behind AR and
BR (A1, A2, B1, etc.) change addresses on a periodic basis, independent of one another.
Despite the apparent simplicity of this setup, several questions must be answered.
First, how do the nodes keep track of one another? If every node knows about all the
others, then scalability might become an issue, as every client presumably has to maintain
some amount of data on fellow hopping clients to determine the IP each one possesses at
any given time. It may be possible to devise a scheme where this flaw is mitigated by
having all clients hop using the same secret and they each know just the broad IP ranges
where fellow hoppers reside (i.e., the AR nodes know that 10.2.2.0/24 is a network they talk
to with hopping), but this accentuates the next question: how do clients choose their hops?
Each node must know some secret from which IP addresses are generated, hopefully
in a manner which appears random to outsiders yet is predictable for those with the secret.
The secret combined with the algorithm used to generate IP addresses results in what this
thesis refers to as a “hopping pattern.” The most obvious approach is to share a single secret
amongst all nodes in a give “hopping network.” In the example network, this would mean
A1, A2, B1, and B2 all possess the same secret. While straightforward, this does have the
potential flaw of revealing too much information to an eavesdropper though: with a large
number of nodes all following a hopping pattern based on the same key, it may be easier to
deduce the secret [Sha49].
Giving each node a separate secret would solve this issue. However, each client now
has to maintain even more information on every other client. For a small number of nodes
this is not a problem, but if the intention is to scale to thousands or tens of thousands of
clients problems with processing and key distribution may arise.
Just as importantly, however, is the question of how nodes coordinate their IP address
choices. As discussed in Section 2.1, IP routing requires addresses follow a largely
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hierarchical setup. Thus, if A owns the network address range 10.1.1.0/24, then all of
its nodes must fall within the address range of 10.1.1.1 through 10.1.1.255. This means
that when each node hops it must remain within the valid range of the network to which it
connects and that the address it chooses must not already be taken by another node. Given
enough nodes in a subnet, a conflict is quite possible, leading to unpredictable network
behavior. For example, in the example network A there are 255 available IP addresses.
As shown by the birthday paradox, there is a 50% chance (on every hop) of having an IP
address conflict with only 20 hosts, assuming uncoordinated random hops [Buc04]. On
a larger network with 65,535 possible IPs (a /16 network), only 302 hosts are needed to
exceed a 50% collision probability.
The easiest solution to this problem is to give each node a unique, non-overlapping
address range in which to hop. This requires no on-going communication with other nodes
to work well and has the distinct advantage of working properly with existing defenses (i.e.,
a firewall with special rules for a host can point to the range for that host, rather than an
individual IP). This setup requires a large enough address space to make hopping beneficial.
If a given node only has five possible addresses in which to hop, for instance, it becomes
trivial for an attacker to just keep trying a single IP address until the node returns to it.
IPv6 would alleviate this problem, as the Internet Engineering Task Force recommends the
allocation of a /64 address space (264 addresses) to every link [SWLX02], but IPv4 with its
more limited address space would not allow this flexibility and, unfortunately, the reality
of current networks mandates support for IPv4 [CGKR].
With enough coordination between nodes everyone could share the same address
space. A fair amount of work would need to be put into an algorithm and protocol to
synchronize the hosts’ address changes, but this is not insurmountable. This does break
most special cases in firewalls unless the firewall is either made aware of the IP hopping
system or hosts that need special rules do not change addresses at all.
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Despite the negatives given above, end point hopping does have advantages. First,
scalability issues lie more in storage space and key lookup speed than actual computation,
as every node only has to perform packet transformations for their own incoming and
outgoing packets. Additionally, many IP hopping schemes incorporate encryption, which
may consume a relatively large proportion of processing time [KFLD01, MPS+02].
Distributing this load may be beneficial. Second, end point hopping protects clients from
probing no matter where the adversary is in the network. For example, as long as M1 in our
example network lacks the hopping key, they have no more of an advantage in scanning any
of the A or B nodes than M2, who is outside the network. Finally, end point hopping comes
with the ability for individual nodes such as C1 to easily connect to the main hopping
network without the need to develop new software or deploy extra hardware. This is in
distinct contrast to gateway-based hopping, which by definition uses a separate system to
handle hopping, as Section 2.2.2 discusses.
2.2.2 Gateway hopping.
The alternative to end point hopping is to move the hopping to network gateways. In
such a scheme, networks are placed behind gateways that alter all traffic passing through
them appropriately. What “appropriately” means varies with every implementation, but in
one way or another, a gateway outside of the actual end points alters the IP traffic to make
it appear as though the systems inside are changing IP addresses. Referring back to the
example network in Figure 2.3, gateways AR and BR would be in charge of these packet
transformations, altering traffic from the clients inside their networks (e.g., A1, A2, etc.)
to outside hosts. The hopping secrets stored on end points in end point hopping are now
stored at the gateway, with each gateway getting its own unique set of keys; the gateways
typically lack precise knowledge of the end points they protect.
Nodes inside the network may or may not have knowledge of the hopping. In
most instances the hopping occurs with no modification of the end points and is largely
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transparent [AA06]. The need to only deploy a small number of gateway systems, rather
than altering every client system, gives gateway-based hopping an advantage over end
point-based on larger networks. Applying software and/or hardware changes to every
system is costly in terms of both time and manpower. Even more significantly, legacy
systems running older operating systems might need custom solutions, increasing the cost
of deployment.
The most common observable side effect of gateway hopping (beyond the latency
associated with the additional processing) is Transmission Control Protocol (TCP)
connection dropping. Because TCP depends on IP addresses and ports numbers to
identify on-going connections, any alterations to this information would traditionally kill
the connection [AAMA07]. This is a problem also faced by end point hopping schemes,
but is more easily corrected because the individual machines know the state of connections
and can correct appropriately. With gateway hopping, however, the situation may require
more significant state tracking and packet inspection at the gateway.
Because of this required state tracking and the need for a single system to alter
all traffic in and out of an entire network, gateway-based hopping presents a possible
performance problem. With enough traffic or individual nodes behind a gateway, it may
be possible to overload the gateway, leading to dropped packets and failing connections.
Depending on gateway design this may be avoided; some studies show an additional CPUs
load of around 10% even when encryption is applied, when compared to standard routing
[AA06]. While noticeable, this increase does not cause immediate issues. Additionally,
impact would likely be lower with modern processors, due to the introduction of hardware
encryption on-chip [BBGR09].
Finally, gateway hopping may have more difficulty accommodating individual clients
connecting to the network. In C1’s case, for instance, if it wanted to be able to talk to
A1, it would need to obtain the appropriate hopping information from AR and alter its own
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traffic accordingly. There are several techniques to make this work, but all of them require
more work than an end-point hopping system would, simply because end-point hopping is
already designed around the concept of individual nodes connecting together.
2.3 Data Security
2.3.1 Hashing.
Cryptographic hash functions take a given sequence of bytes and return a fixed-
length string of bits representing that data. While their output is not unique for every
input, cryptographic hashes attempt to make it infeasible to generate two messages with
the same hash or to modify an input and get the same hash. As illustrated in Table 2.3,
these properties allow the use of hashes to verify data because even small changes result in
different output.
Table 2.3: Hashing example
Input Output (SHA-1)
Original The quick brown fox jumped c950af1b07223c7d8590538189b3bcd9f4e08c6c
Changed The quick brawn fox jumped 97c592d5c0d991b91c68edb3941b1bb075a97f56
Here even a small change (o to a) resulted in a significantly different output. If the
sender gave both the data and the hash to a recipient, the recipient would be able to repeat
the hash on the data and verify that their hash matches the one the sender gave them. Hash
algorithms, like the Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA) family used in this example, are widely
published, so anyone can produce a valid hash of any data they want. This means that
hashes alone do not prevent against malicious modification: an attacker can modify data,
then produce a new hash to match. To counter this problem, either a digital signature or a
Hashed Message Authentication Code (HMAC) must be used, as covered in Section 2.3.3.
15
2.3.2 Encryption.
Encryption is a crucial component of most hopping systems. Additionally, encryption
forms the basis of digital signatures, a means of verifying that a given message—a single
packet, in most contexts here—came from where the receiver believes. It is not important
for the purposes for this thesis to understand the math behind encryption, but a few concepts
are helpful.
Encryption comes in two major flavors, symmetric and asymmetric. Symmetric
encryption uses the same key for encryption and decryption and, in many cases, is relatively
fast. Newer CPUs, such as Intel’s Core processors, include hardware instructions for the
commonly used Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) algorithm, increasing symmetric
encryption’s speed even further [Gue10]. Because anyone with the encryption key can
decrypt the data, participants must establish their shared secret in a secure way.
Asymmetric encryption—also referred to as public-key encryption—provides a way
to exchange secure data without having to establish a secret key in advance. In asymmetric
encryption a public key, known to everyone, and a corresponding private key, known only
to one participant, are used. If a sender wants to transmit data to a specific receiver
securely, they encrypt the data with the receiver’s public key. When the receiver gets
the transmission, they decrypt it with their private key. Because no one else knows the
private key of the receiver, it is impossible for anyone else to decrypt the data, even though
the encryption key is widely known. In exchange for the robustness and openness of this
encryption style, asymmetric encryption algorithms tend to be slow when compared to
symmetric encryption.
Asymmetric and symmetric encryption are typically used together in network
communications. When a connection is first established, a public-key encryption scheme
such as Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman (RSA) determines the shared symmetric key, then
all future data is encrypted with a symmetric algorithm like AES [CS03]. This hybrid
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approach provides the best of both worlds: no need to establish a shared secret in advance
and speed during longer communications.
2.3.3 Authentication.
Authenticating that a given sequence of bytes actually comes from whom they say
they do can be done through either a HMAC [KBC97] or a digital signature [JK03].
These algorithms are based on symmetric and asymmetric encryption, respectively, and
therefore share the same strengths and weaknesses. Both algorithms are widely used today
in protocols like IP Security (IPsec) [MG98] and user-level data like email [RT10].
HMAC works through a series of multiple hashes with the data and an encryption key.
Both sender and receiver have the same shared symmetric key, allowing them each to do
the HMAC process independently. The sender includes their computation of the HMAC
with the original data, then the receiver calculates their own HMAC and ensures it matches
the one sent with the message. If it does, the receiver knows the message is unchanged and
comes from someone with the correct shared key.
For a digital signature, the sender encrypts the data’s hash with their own private key.
The recipient verifies the authenticity of the message by performing their own hash of the
data and decrypting the signature with the sender’s public key. If the calculated hash and
the decrypted hash match, the sender must be who they claim to be, as only that sender has
access to the correct private key.
2.3.4 Combining for Full Effect.
By combining encryption and authentication, two parties can communication with
confidentiality and integrity. For public key encryption, a sender signs the message with
their own private key, then encrypts the message with the public key of the recipient [An01].
The recipient decrypts the message with their private key, then verifies the signature with
the public key of the sender.
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For symmetric encryption, the opposite order is used. First the sender encrypts the
data with one symmetric key, then adds an HMAC of the ciphertext [BN00]. The receiver
computes the HMAC of the cipher text and verifies the attached one to ensure the integrity
and authenticity of the message. The receiver then decrypts the data.
2.4 Time-Based One-Time Password (TOTP)
The system discussed in this thesis relies heavily on values that are unpredictable to
an outsider but calculable for anyone with the secret key. The algorithm behind these
values is Time-Based One-Time Password (TOTP) [MMPR11], which in turn relies on
the HMAC-Based One-Time Password (HOTP) algorithm [MBH+05]. Both of these
algorithms are frequently used in two-factor authentication systems employed by banks
and other websites, with a smartphone app or key fob displaying the current password
[AZEH09].
HOTP utilizes a key of at least 128-bits and a “counter” to produce its output. These
are passed to a SHA-based HMAC, which produces a 20-byte string. It then applies a
“truncation” process to the HMAC, returning a four-byte output [MBH+05]. If both sides of
an exchange know the key and the current counter, they are able to independently produce
the same value.
The counter for HOTP is set based on some event determined by the system designer.
In the most literal case, the usage of a given output for authentication causes an internal
counter to be incremented. In a situation like this, both sides of the HOTP (the sender and
the receiver) must keep their counters in-sync or the two will produce differing values and
need to be resynchronized.
To work around the desynchronization problem, time may instead be used as the basis
of the counter. RFC 6238 defines TOTP as a simple extension of HOTP where the counter
becomes the current time divided by a configured time step [MMPR11]. This change allows
18
all parties interested in a given TOTP to produce the same value as long as they keep their
clocks relatively similar (within one time step).
2.5 Previous Implementations
2.5.1 BBN’s Dynamic Network Address Translation (DYNAT).
BBN Technologies’ 2001 paper entitled “Dynamic Approaches to Thwart Adversary
Intelligence Gathering” tests the hypothesis that “dynamic modification of defense
structure improves system assurance” [KFLD01]. In the paper they lay out a custom
address space randomization solution called Dynamic Network Address Translation
(DYNAT).
A series of red-team tests against their DYNAT are used to test if the addition of IP
hopping decreases an adversary’s ability to map the network. The experimentation confirms
BBN’s hypothesis: DYNAT does increase system assurance because the adversary’s work
greatly increases in comparison to static networks. Even when the red team receives
detailed knowledge of the DYNAT’s operation, the adversary could not identify a critical
server in an enclave with DYNAT active [KFLD01].
BBN’s implementation focuses on individual clients connecting to a server collection
through a DYNAT gateway on the server end. This gateway transforms incoming and
outgoing packets between “true” host identification information—e.g., the actual IP address
and port number of a server inside the enclave’s network—and values which vary based on
a pre-shared key and time. On the client side, a “DYNAT shim” sits in the network stack
and does the same thing, transparently allowing client applications to work with the server
enclave. Additionally, DYNAT applies encryption to all traffic for confidentiality.
BBN’s experiments also found that encryption of the packets is crucial, as the attackers
can trivially sniff the traffic to find important servers, even if they do not know the real IP
address or port of the target. For example, an attacker might see a packet containing an
Hypertext Transport Protocol (HTTP) response and thus learn an active IP and port for a
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web server, even if probing for the server is impossible. While this information remains
valid for a limited period, it may give enough time for the attacker to compromise the
internal network.
2.5.2 Sandia Dynat.
Sandia National Labs’ 2001 final report on their extensive work in the “dynat” field
examines virtually every detail in IP hopping systems, from how hopping is synchronized
to where in the network it is implemented [MPS+02]. This paper points to many of the
important issues that must be considered when implementing or deploying an IP hopping
tool.
Of note are Sandia’s recommendations on the location of the deployment of a gateway-
based DYNAT. In order to avoid interference with existing firewall rules—particularly ones
with a stateful firewall—a hopping gateway must be deployed beyond the current system.
Likewise, for gateway-based Virtual Private Networks (VPNs), there is often a static IP
requirement to allow for authentication [MPS+02], so an IP hopping gateway must also lie
beyond the VPN concentrator, closer to the public-facing side of the network. Essentially,
the hopping gateway should be the last system before each network connects to the outside
world [MPS+02].
The Sandia report also provides significant insight into the interaction of a DYNAT
with IPsec and strongly suggests a combination of the two. First, the encryption from IPsec
avoids the ineffectiveness of address space randomization if the packets can be trivially
sniffed for information, as BBN’s work reveals [KFLD01]. Second, a DYNAT strengthens
IPsec, as the hopping gateway can quickly reject invalid packets based on invalid source and
destination identifiers, rather than forcing IPsec to perform expensive HMAC computations
and/or encryption. However, the report also warns that the use of IPsec with a hopping
gateway can reduce some aspects of DYNAT’s access control because more identifiers are
encrypted and unusable.
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2.5.3 Applications that Participate in their Own Defense (APOD).
BBN continued work in the dynamic network address translation field and proposed
another IP hopping implementation in 2003 as part of the Defense Advanced Research
Projects Agency (DARPA) Applications that Participate in their Own Defense (APOD)
project [APWJ03]. This system is a refinement of their previous DYNAT, featuring a NAT
gateway sitting either on the server host itself or on a gateway into the network.
The primary differences between APOD and the previous DYNAT relates to
implementation. Whereas the BBN DYNAT is a very specialized solution, APOD employs
standard Commercial Off-The-Shelf (COTS) utilities, such as Linux’s iptables, to perform
much of its work. APOD’s researchers propose the use of a NAT gateway on the networks
of both the client and the server, rather than a gateway only at the server side and/or
specialized software on each end point.
2.5.4 Network Address Space Randomization (NASR).
The 2005 Network Address Space Randomization (NASR) project is an IP address
hopping system designed to defeat hitlist-based worms [AAMA07]. These worms spread
to pre-collected lists of IP addresses that are likely vulnerable and typically propagate much
faster than traditional worms that target random IPs. To fight this, NASR causes the pre-
built hitlists to decay by changing IP addresses on a periodic basis. When the addresses
change, the worm’s lists are now inaccurate, giving them fewer exploitable targets.
The most unique aspect of this research is the use of Dynamic Host Configuration
Protocol (DHCP) to force the changes. Through the use of a slightly intelligent DHCP
server that leases IPs for a only a short time frame (on the order of tens of minutes) and
only offers IPs that have not been used recently, most networks already using DHCP can
quickly change to a randomized scheme. This simplicity does come at a cost, however:
TCP connections die whenever the IP change occurs, forcing the hopping period to be
quite long or risk unacceptable connection losses.
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NASR attempts to reduce this issue by introducing additional intelligence into the
DHCP server to allow it to detect “long-lived” TCP connections (i.e., a download) and give
clients the same IP if they appear busy. Beyond that, they also monitor what services each
client uses, as many are resilient to a connection being torn down [AAMA07]. Despite
those improvements, address changes occur even in the fastest of instances only once an
hour or so. As tests show, this meets the goal of hitlist worm protection, but is likely
inadequate for obfuscating the network from a more intelligent, focused enemy.
2.5.5 Network Address Hopping (NAH).
A 2005 paper by European researchers presents a system they call Network Address
Hopping (NAH) [SSH05]. This system focuses on a client contacting a server as
a negotiable protection measure, rather than an always-on system used between pre-
configured systems.
A protocol employing IPv6 allows a client to tell a server that they supported (and
wish to use) NAH. If the server supports NAH, it replies with its hopping pattern. The
client sends its own hopping pattern, before reconnecting using the pattern the server just
gave it. Hops occur based on packet count per connection, rather than a time-based factor.
Once again, the NAH authors note the importance of encryption in maintaining the
confidentiality of the data stream. However, they also state that without encryption the
system still provides some benefit, as packets bound for “different” addresses might follow
differing network routes due to the different (perceived) destinations. If this occurs, an
attacker needs to either compromise a route fairly close to an endpoint to ensure they see
all traffic or compromise every possible route and collate the traffic together. Even if they
manage to accomplish that, the attacker would still have to collect all traffic passing them
in order to reconstruct the full stream (because they are unable to filter for specific IPs
to identify the connection they are interested in), which poses a storage and computation
problem given enough data [SSH05].
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As an additional side effect of the variable routing, the researchers noted that such a
system may actually increase the throughput and reliability of a system. If multiple routing
paths are used, the network may avoid congestion and allow traffic to flow more smoothly
[MHCN96]. While this is not an important aspect of this system, the potential does add
support to the employment of address hopping [SSH05].
2.5.6 Transparent Address Obfuscation (TAO).
The 2006 TAO project focuses on protection of the Internet as a whole from hitlist-
based worms and is somewhat based on the previous work in NASR [AAMA07]. It features
gateways on networks that maintain external-to-internal address mappings for all nodes
inside the protected network, with the external addresses changing with a configurable
frequency. To maintain existing connections regardless of mapping changes, TAO includes
a NAT table.
A disadvantage of this design comes in the form of address space overhead, because
each individual box receives a publicly accessible IP and the NAT table claims additional
IPs for on-going connections. Testing shows that around 10% more address space is needed
for three simulations on large-scale networks. However, TAO has the distinct advantage of
only requiring the addition of a single box at the network’s edge and no cooperation from
remote hosts is needed for it to provide its services.
2.6 Summary
This chapter presents background topics used in this thesis, including IP routing,
encryption and authentication, and Time-Based One-Time Passwords. IP hopping and the
two possible approaches to it—end point or gateway—are discussed, along with an analysis
of each of their benefits and challenges. Finally, previous research in network address space
randomization is discussed.
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III. Implementation
The research this thesis presents relies on a custom IP address hopping solution.
This chapter covers many of the details of this system, from high-level architecture to the
network protocol. Section 3.1 covers the requirements this system strives to meet. Section
3.2 gives an architecture overview, while Section 3.3 covers the details of each component
in the system. Section 3.4 details the network protocol used by the system to coordinate
gateways.
3.1 Requirements
ARG focuses on the needs of military networks. These are essentially the needs of
any geographically-diverse organization: locations throughout the world, high availability
and reliability requirements, and security over any network through which its data travels
[Mal97].
ARG primarily attempts to protect communication outside of military-controlled
networks and prevent external entities from probing internally. This protection includes
privacy, as ARG (like any network address space randomization tool) helps hide
information from adversaries by obfuscating sender and receiver information [SK02]. This
means that the implementation described is intended to be employed for all traffic traveling
between bases, but is unconcerned with internal base traffic. Internal network defense
remains the purview of traditional defenses. Base networks, in this case, include both those
on permanent installations and those in deployed, forward locations.
ARG must operate over the commercial Internet. Some proposals for network address
space randomization require changes to the Internet’s existing routing infrastructure and
protocols [WL03, APWJ03]. Deploying such a solution may be possible and beneficial in
the long run, but a solution that could be deployed today without participation from outside
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entities is more feasible. This is especially true for forward locations, where traffic is more
likely to utilize infrastructure outside the military’s control.
Like any large, distributed organization, bases can generate huge volumes of traffic,
so ARG must scale well. Due to the importance of networks to command and control,
ARG’s implementation must not introduce significant latency under any foreseeable load.
Likewise, there can never be a brief period where all connections drop. At a minimum,
given the number of nodes inside the network, dropped connections result in a massive
amount of wasted bandwidth as they are reestablished and the data retransmitted.
Military networks contain a wide range of hardware and software. Much of this
software cannot be altered to accommodate ARG, so it must function transparently. Host-
level implementations might be feasible for generic workstation images (i.e., an alteration
to the operating system’s network stack), but the ability to function in another way must
exist to allow legacy equipment to continue operating.
3.2 Architecture Overview
As illustrated in Figure 3.1, ARG functions entirely around standard networks with
hopping gateways. This matches the “gateway hopping” scheme discussed in Section
2.2.2. As with [AA06], these gateways are standalone systems, not intended for use
with other tasks. Individual hosts inside these networks have no knowledge of the traffic
transformations the gateways perform, whether their connections are routing to a host
inside the local network, to a host inside another associated hopping network (hereafter
referred to as an “ARG network”), or to an external network. The implementation of ARG
allows the deployment of standard passive defense technologies like firewalls inside the
network without reconfiguration. Each gateway maintains a NAT-like table to ensure that
existing connections are maintained across hops (essentially temporarily leaving the old IP
active for just those connections using it already).
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ARG Gateway A
Subnet: 172.100.0.0/16
Pub Key: BB
Priv Key: AA
Hop Interval: 250 ms
Client 1
External Host
Internet
Client 3
ARG Gateway B
Subnet: 172.200.0.0/16
Pub Key: XX
Priv Key: YY
Hop Interval: 500 ms
Client 2
Figure 3.1: ARG conceptual network layout
Each gateway is given what subnet it is permitted to hop within, a private/public key
pair, and time it should wait between IP address changes (frequently referred to as its “hop
interval”). For example, ARG Gateway A in Figure 3.1 uses subnet 172.100.0.0/16, has
the specified public and private keys, and hops every 250 milliseconds. Additionally, each
gateway is pre-configured with knowledge of at least one other gateway. The configured
information consists solely of the subnet the other gateway is handling and a public key to
use for authentication with it. In the figure, this would mean that Gateway A knows that
Gateway B sits in the 172.200.0.0/16 subnet and has the public key XX, but nothing else.
The gateways transfer additional information during the connection process.
At startup, each gateway generates a random symmetric encryption key and a “hop
key.” They then attempt to connect to all other gateways for which they have configuration
files through a series of data and time synchronization packets. Once two gateways fully
connect, they exchange data about all other gateways they have configured, allowing ARG
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nodes to connect to gateways for which they do not have physical configuration files.
Periodically gateways re-send time synchronization information, ensuring that changing
network conditions do not kill communication. Section 3.4 and Appendix B cover each of
these packet exchanges in more detail.
Once connected, packets between ARG networks are encapsulated, encrypted, and
authenticated by the originating network’s gateway, with each packet given the destination
network’s current IP address. On receipt, a gateway checks that the IPs match what they
expect (both its own IP and the source’s IP), then validates the authentication information
(signature/HMAC) before forwarding the original packet into their network. Packets to
external hosts flow through the NAT-style system covered in Section 3.3.3.
During the evaluation of IPs, gateways allow packets to match either the current
address or the previous one. This allows packets sent just before an IP change to still be
accepted. If a gateway’s hop interval is shorter than twice the one-way latency, packets will
never be accepted, as illustrated in Figure 3.2. In this figure, Gate A sends a packet to Gate
B with the destination addresses set to the current IP at that time (172.200.210.85). The
packet takes 50 milliseconds to travel across the network, during which time the gateways
change addresses twice. When the packet reaches Gate B it is rejected, because the packet’s
destination IP does not match the current (172.200.38.138) or previous (172.200.60.97) IPs.
3.3 Components
The handling of packets within ARG is distinctly different if they are to an external
(non-ARG network) host or to an ARG network. These processes are handled by two
separate components, the hopper and the NAT. A high-level director decides which of these
two receives each incoming packets. All of these components run as separate threads on
the same gateway, closely coordinating their work. Because it is in charge of overall system
operation, this section begins by discussing the director.
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Figure 3.2: Packet sent between gateways when hop interval is half the latency
3.3.1 Director.
The director is in charge of receiving packets on the internal and external interfaces of
the gateway. Upon receipt of a packet, the director parses the packet and decides how to
handle it. The director’s decision tree is illustrated in Figure 3.3 and discussed below.
In the case of ARP requests on either interface, the director replies with the gateway’s
MAC address. This feature of ARG allows its use without any changes to the network it is
placed in, as hosts continue to send to the “same” gateway IP as before and ARG responds,
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Figure 3.3: ARG director flow
despite not technically possessing an internal IP of its own. For example, the inside hosts
send out an ARP request for their normal IP gateway (as Section 2.1.3 discusses) and
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the ARG gateway sends an ARP response, allowing it to grab all traffic and process it
appropriately. More details on Ethernet and IP routing can be found in Sections 2.1.3 and
2.1.1.
For outgoing packets (packets that are sent from within the protected network that
are intended to leave the network), the director checks the destination IP of the packet.
If the IP is unknown, it is passed to the NAT module. If the IP is within another ARG
network the director knows, the packet is handed off to the hopper module to be wrapped
and transmitted.
For incoming packets (packets hitting the external interface), the director first checks
if the source IP is another ARG network. If it is not, the director quickly hands the packet
off to the NAT inbound handler.
If the packet is from another ARG network, the director checks if the packet type
indicates it is an administrative packet and hands it off to the hopper’s administrative
processor. If it is not an administrative packet, the director confirms the gateway which sent
the packet is actually connected. Which gateway is determined by matching the source IP
to the base IP and mask in the local gateway’s configuration. Assuming that the gateway is
connected, the local gateway checks that the source and destination IPs are correct, based
on the data the hopper has on the other gateway. Assuming all checks pass, the packet is
handed off to the hopper to be unwrapped and forwarded into the network. If any fail, the
packet is silently dropped.
3.3.2 Hopper.
The hopping module is the heart of ARG. It maintains the state of the gateways (e.g.,
keys, hop intervals, times) it knows about and transfers packets to and from the network it
is protecting. The other two components (director and NAT) talk to the hopper to obtain
current IP information and if a given gateway is connected or not.
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When the hopper first starts, it initializes a list of gateways with data from
configuration files. The information maintained in this structure is shown in Table 3.1.
Table 3.1: Information hopper module maintains on other ARG gateways
Data Information Source
IP Range (IP and mask) Configuration file (see Appendix D)
RSA Public Key Configuration file
Hop Interval Transferred during connection (see Section 3.4)
Symmetric Key Transferred during connection
Hop Key Transferred during connection
Time Base Calculated based on latency (see Appendix B)
An administrative thread is started at the same time. This thread attempts to connect
to each gateway in its list periodically and, if it does not hear from a given gateway for
several minutes, marks gateways as disconnected. In addition, it sends periodic time
synchronization requests to connected gateways, especially if it sees a large percentage
of packets being rejected due to incorrect IP addresses.
Beyond the administrative thread, actions occur in the hopper only when the director
passes packets off to it. Outgoing packets are always wrapped, encrypted, and signed, as
covered under the “route packet” process in Section B.2.4. Incoming packets go through
the validation process shown in Figure 3.4 before being handled. Note that IP checking
is done in the director before control reaches the hopper. After validation exact handling
depends on the packet type, but is generally covered in Section 3.4 as part of the protocol
discussion.
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Figure 3.4: ARG incoming packet validation process
3.3.3 Network Address Translator.
The NAT component of ARG maintains a list of on-going connections to external
hosts. For instance, if a client inside a protected network connects to 72.246.189.120, the
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NAT creates an entry in an internal table and allows packets from the external host back in
to the network and to the client. This is almost identical to the operation of the basic NAT
discussed in Section 2.1.2. The only difference from a normal NAT system is the addition
of an extra field in the NAT table for the IP at the time the connection was first established.
The new version of the table with example data is shown in Table 3.2 with the new column
in italics.
Table 3.2: ARG NAT table example
Int IP Int Port Remote IP Remote Port Ext IP Ext Port
1 192.168.0.103 3547 74.125.225.69 443 172.1.123.35 50003
2 192.168.0.103 8751 207.109.73.34 80 172.1.73.1 42630
3 192.168.0.112 30452 4.27.2.253 80 172.1.86.173 53920
The traditional NAT processing and logic is supplemented with this additional
information. When a packet goes out, the table is checked and the packet has its source
IP address and port changed to the external values. If this is the first packet in a connection,
the external IP is filled from the current IP of the gateway. When an incoming packet is
encountered, the external IP and port are both checked to determine the correct internal
host. The addition of the external IP to the table allows connections to survive across
hops; many connections last longer than ARG’s intended hop rate and severing connections
frequently is unacceptable for many applications.
3.4 ARG Protocol
The ARG protocol is designed to be fairly stateless, simplifying the implementation
and lowering the likelihood of an exploit forcing the gateway into an unexpected state.
ARG sends data between gateways as the direct payload of the IP packet; transport-layer
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protocols such as User Datagram Protocol (UDP) and TCP are not used. If needed, the
protocol could be adapted easily to work as a UDP payload. ARG packets are identified by
IP protocol 253, a protocol reserved for experimentation [Nar04]. All packets sent between
ARG gateways use the header structure shown in Table 3.3.
Table 3.3: ARG packet data
Data Size Data Type
Version 1 byte Unsigned Integer
Message Type 1 byte Enumeration, see Table 3.4
Message Length 2 bytes Unsigned Integer
Sequence Number 4 bytes Unsigned Integer
Signature 128 bytes Raw
Payload 0-32,629 bytes Message-type specific, see Appendix B
For this research, the protocol version field is set to 1 at all times. The type field
tells the receiving gateway how to process the data contained in the message. Possible
values are shown in Table 3.4. More details on the format of each message type are given
in Appendix B. Length is the network-order size in bytes of the data from the version to
the end of the data; given the size of the message header, the minimum for this is 136.
The sequence number is a monotonically increasing unsigned integer value used to prevent
replay attacks.
The signature field may actually contain two possible values: a true RSA digital
signature of the packet or an HMAC of the packet, depending on the message type. Packets
of type PING or CONN REQ/CONN RESP are encrypted with the public key of the receiver
and signed with the private key of the sender. All other packets—types WRAPPED and
TRUST DATA—are encrypted with the symmetric key of the receiver and include an HMAC
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Table 3.4: ARG message types
Mnemonic Value Description
WRAPPED 1 Encapsulated packet from protected client to protected client
PING 2 Time synchronization message
CONN RESP 3 Connection data response message
CONN REQ 4 Connection data and request for other gateway’s data
TRUST DATA 5 Configuration information
of the encrypted data using with the symmetric key of the sender, following standard
encrypt-then-MAC practice [BN00]. The encryption and signing combinations used for
each message type as well as whether or not the source and destination IP addresses are
strictly checked are summarized in Table 3.5.
As a side note, the encrypt-then-sign order used by ARG (when using a digital
signature rather than an HMAC) is backwards according to best-practice RSA and should
be corrected to sign-then-encrypt [AN95]. It may also be wise to add the name of the
sending gateway to each message to help prevent similar mistakes in the future [AN94].
The order ARG uses allows an attacker to sign a message and claim it as their own
[Ram99]. However, ARG gateways will still reject these falsified messages because the
receiving gateway will not have a public key for the signer. A gateway could successfully
sign another gateway’s message, but this indicates a compromised of the gateway itself, at
which point the attacker has full access to the entire network anyway.
There are four basic exchanges that happen between ARG gateways: connect, time
synchronization, trust data exchange, and packet transfer. In order for gateways to begin
exchanging packets between the networks they are protecting (via the “route packet”
process), they must first fully connect by completing the connect and time synchronization
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Table 3.5: ARG message security summary
Type Encryption Signing IPs checked?
WRAPPED AES, remote key HMAC, local key Yes
PING RSA, remote public key Signature, local private key No
CONN RESP RSA, remote public key Signature, local private key No
CONN REQ RSA, remote public key Signature, local private key No
TRUST DATA AES, remote key HMAC, local key No
processes. The trust data exchange step is optional, although it allows gateways to connect
to others without configuration files. The precise requests, receives, and verifications for
each exchange are given in Appendix B.
3.5 Summary
This chapter discusses the implementation of ARG. It begins with the requirements
ARG fulfills, then covers the high-level architecture of the system. The chapter then
examines each component and the protocol ARG uses between gateways.
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IV. Methodology
This chapter discusses the methodology used to measure the effectiveness of ARG at
correctly classifying valid and invalid traffic, the shortest supportable hop interval at various
network latencies, the maximum packet rate ARG can handle, and the overall stability of
the system under test. Section 4.1 discusses the problem this research seeks to answer.
Section 4.2 defines the System Under Test (SUT), and Section 4.3 goes into detail on the
possible outcomes of the Component Under Test (CUT). Section 4.4 covers the workload
presented to the SUT, Section 4.5 covers the configurable parameters of the SUT, and
Section 4.7 covers the metrics collected. Sections 4.6 and 4.8 detail the actual tests and the
purpose of each.
4.1 Problem Definition
4.1.1 Goals and Hypothesis.
This research tests whether network address space randomization as discussed in
Chapter 3 is suitable for deployment on a corporate or military network. Tests against
this system are designed to answer four basic questions:
1. Does ARG classify traffic correctly? What percentage of false positives (valid
packets blocked) and false negatives (invalid traffic allowed through) does it
introduce?
2. What is the maximum packet rate and throughput ARG can support?
3. What is the minimum supportable time between hops? How does latency affect this?
4. Is ARG stable when presented with corrupt, malformed, or replayed packets?
It is hypothesized that ARG correctly classifies 99% of traffic it encounters when
operating with a hop interval appropriate for the network latency. In addition, this thesis
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hypothesizes that packet loss becomes acceptable when the hop interval matches or exceeds
the one-way network latency, where acceptable loss is defined as less than 2%. This
percentage is based on the loss seen on Massachusetts Institute of Technology’s wireless
networks [Tal12]. The other two questions are informational as the results apply only to
this specific hopping gateway implementation, but it is believed that ARG is stable in the
face of malformed traffic and it can handle at least 10 megabits per second (Mbps) of traffic.
4.1.2 Approach.
This research is accomplished on a test network with nodes representing the types
of hosts found on a typical, corporate-style network. These include trusted hosts inside
trusted networks which communicate freely, internal and external servers that must be
accessible to hosts inside these trusted networks, and malicious hosts outside the networks.
A configurable custom hopping gateway sits in front of the trusted networks.
Traffic generators and collectors run on the test network, determining which traffic
flows successfully make it to their intended destination. This includes examining both false
positive and false negative rates, determining why ARG rejects packets that should get
through and why it allows packets that should be rejected. After a given test, logs and
traffic captures are collated to form a complete picture of the traffic on the network before
determining statistics.
4.2 System Boundaries
The SUT is ARG, the custom IP hopping gateway developed specifically for this effort.
The basic components of this system, the various inputs into the system, possible outputs,
and the metrics provided are illustrated in Figure 4.1. The sections following cover aspects
of this diagram in more detail, with Section 4.3 discussing the possible outcomes, Section
4.4 covering the workload, Section 4.5 detailing the parameters in use, and Section 4.7
covering the metrics collected.
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Figure 4.1: ARG SUT diagram
4.3 System Services
This thesis tests three components of ARG. Most important is the hopper module,
which provides a rapidly-changing external IP address and details on connected ARG
networks. Using this information, it transports packets between ARG-protected networks.
Packets to and from external hosts—hosts that are not part of an ARG network—go through
the NAT module. Finally, the director module hands packets off to each of the other
modules and collects the results back to be logged and potentially acted upon. More details
on these components are in Chapter 3.
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The potential outcomes of the director are shown below, broken into separate sections
based on incoming or outgoing packets. Other services do not directly offer outcomes
relevant to this research.
• Director - Incoming
– Accepted: Rewritten and forwarded - Packet is from non-ARG network and is
rewritten via NAT table before forwarding.
– Accepted: Unwrapped and forwarded - Packet is from ARG network and passes
validation checks. Contents are extracted and forwarded internally.
– Rejected: Incorrect source IP - Packet is coming from an ARG network but
does not have what the local gateway believes is the current source IP for the
other gateway.
– Rejected: Incorrect destination IP - Packet is coming from an ARG network but
does not have the current local gateway IP as the destination.
– Rejected: Incorrect message size - The message length does not match the
message type.
– Rejected: Incorrect sequence number - The message’s sequence number is not
monotonically increasing.
– Rejected: Unable to verify signature/HMAC - Packet signature invalid/nonex-
istent (if coming from an ARG network).
– Rejected: No NAT bucket/entry - Packet is coming from a non-ARG network
but does not have a valid entry in the NAT table.
– Rejected: Misc - Some operating system-level errors may occur, resulting in
rare errors in sending or receiving packets.
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• Director - Outgoing
– Accepted: Rewritten and forwarded - Packet is destined for non-ARG network.
An entry is made/retrieved from the NAT table and used to rewrite packet.
– Rejected: Gateway not connected - Packet was intended for an ARG network
the gateway is aware of but not yet connected to.
– Rejected: Wrapped and forwarded - Packet is destined for an ARG network.
Wrapped and placed on the external network.
– Rejected: Misc - Some operating system-level errors may occur, resulting in
rare errors in sending or receiving packets.
4.4 Workload
Workload to the system is the traffic flowing through the ARG gateways. Standard
network traffic parameters like packet rate, packet size, protocol types, number of
simultaneous ongoing connections, and lifetime of connections play a role. For the
purposes of this thesis, however, packet rate is the primary factor. Each test involves traffic
generators, all of which may be instructed to wait a given amount of time between each
sent packet. The lower the packet delay, the higher the packet rate.
It is important to note that network performance itself is not a large concern of this
research. Packet rate does provide useful information about the performance of ARG, but
the numbers apply only to this specific implementation. ARG’s development does not
focus on performance in this first iteration, leaving many possible areas for improvement.
Previous research has shown that similar solutions have minimal impact on performance
[SSH05].
All traffic generators in the tests create randomly-sized packets of either UDP or TCP
traffic. The protocol used depends on the test being run at the time; Section 4.8 discusses
each test series and the traffic flows they utilize.
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4.5 System Parameters
As a network application, ARG is affected by both the machine on which it runs and
the network over which it communicates. ARG’s local performance is most affected by
processor and memory speeds, with encryption potentially consuming a fair amount of
processor time and memory speeds impacting virtually all aspects of operation.
The primary physical network parameter that affects ARG is latency. To ensure that
two ARG gateways are able to communicate reliably, packets sent from one gateway to
the other must arrive before the IP addresses used in the send are no longer current. If
hops occur too frequently, a high one-way latency will cause sent packets to frequently
arrive after the receiving gateway has hopped to a different IP address. (Adapting to
latency is an area of potential improvement, as Section 6.3 discusses.) The test environment
inherently introduces less than one millisecond of latency, but artificial latency can be added
to simulate a more realistic range of network conditions.
The primary configuration setting for ARG is the hop interval. ARG allows the
time between hops to be customized from several times a second to minutes apart with
millisecond precision. Each gateway may be configured to hop at different rates, but for
the sake of this thesis the hop intervals for each gateway are identical in a given test.
4.6 Evaluation Technique
Measurement is used to obtain results for each factor level. Due to the fairly complex
interactions needed between ARG gateways and the processing needed to decide how to
handle packets, simulating the system would likely require an equal amount of work with
little benefit.
Setup of the test environment involves a basic seven-node network: three gateways
running ARG, one system on the network protected by each gateway, and one host outside
the network. Figure 4.2 shows the network and the names given to the various systems.
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Figure 4.2: ARG test network layout overview
Protected clients behind the gateways (ProtA1, ProtB1, and ProtC1) may commu-
nicate freely. The protected clients may also talk out to the external host (Ext1), and the
external hosts must then—once that connection is established—be able to talk back into the
network. There is additional administrative traffic directly between the gateways (GateA,
GateB, and GateC). These three basic traffic flows are “valid” traffic.
All traffic beyond what is described above is “invalid.” For example, Ext1 is not
allowed to send traffic in to the protected clients or the gateways without them first initiating
the connection. Malformed traffic sent by any host is also considered invalid. In either case,
invalid traffic should be stopped at the earliest possible opportunity (i.e., the gateway rejects
the packet and keeps it from reaching the internal host) and the gateway must remain stable.
To collect data, each system runs the traffic collection program tcpdump to capture
traffic sent and received into Packet Capture (PCAP) files. The test execution script then
spawns traffic generators on the correct systems in the network, based on what test is being
run. Section 4.8 details the types of traffic each test establishes. Each traffic generator logs
their sends and receives to text log files (one per generator), independent of the tcpdump
traffic captures. After a given trial, the PCAP files and traffic generator logs are collated
and processed with custom scripts to determine the metrics described in Section 4.7. More
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details on the traffic generators and test run sequence can be found in Appendixes C and E.
Appendix F covers the custom results processor.
All trials run on a network of seven physical servers. Each server runs Ubuntu 12.04.1
Server Edition with four gigabytes of Random Access Memory (RAM) and a 2.6 gigahertz
quad-core Intel Xeon. A single switch with four Virtual Local Area Networks (VLANs)
connects each system at 100 Mbps.
4.7 Performance Metrics
As previously stated, this research primarily focuses on the classification accuracy of
ARG and the interaction of the hop interval and latency. Measurements on ARG therefore
concentrate on the outcomes from the director. However, basic statistics on network
performance are collected. The metrics of interest include:
• Percentage of invalid packets accepted
If a packet that should have been rejected is accepted by ARG, it is possible for an
attacker to sneak into the network regardless of the gateway’s existence. This is the
true measure of whether or not ARG is protecting the network. If ARG functions
correctly, this number should remain at zero for all experiments with ARG enabled.
• Percentage of valid packets rejected
In ideal circumstances, this will also be zero. However, network conditions may
result in failures here, which on a real-world network might result in a disruption of
service.
• Number of each type of rejection (each possible outcome from the director)
This reveals where in the processing stage packets are typically caught. If packets get
caught in the later stages of validation—e.g., signature checking—then processing
time has been wasted.
44
• Packets per second and kilobits per second (Kbps)
An easy check on ARG’s performance is comparing the amount of traffic it is
handling against the packet loss it shows. Information about both the number of
packets and the raw number of bits it processes may reveal slightly different results,
so both are collected.
4.8 Experimental Design
Based on the system and workload parameters given in Sections 4.4 and 4.5 and the
goals of this research (as presented in Section 4.1.1), there are eight traffic flows of interest.
Each consists of different types of traffic and flow destinations. These are most easily
visualized in Figure 4.3 on page 49.
These possible traffic flows are used in four sets of experiments, given below. Each
experiment set answers a different research goal and utilizes different factor levels, as
shown in their respective tables.
• Basic tests
Table 4.1 displays the factor levels used for this series of tests. This sequence of tests
verifies that ARG classifies traffic correctly by running every test shown in Figure 4.3
against ARG. Latency is set to 20 milliseconds (Round-Trip Time (RTT)) for all tests
and traffic generators produce packets around every 0.3 seconds. To determine if the
time between hops has a statistically significant impact on certain types of traffic,
every test runs twice, once with a long hop interval of 500 milliseconds and once
with a shorter interval of 50 milliseconds, which is just slightly more than double the
round-trip latency.
• Maximum Throughput
Table 4.2 displays the factor levels used for this series of tests. This sequence gives
an indication of what throughput and packet rate ARG is capable of handling. Packet
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Table 4.1: Factor levels for basic tests
Factor Possible Levels
Hop interval (ms) 500, 50
Round-trip latency (ms) 20
Packet delay (s) 0.3
Traffic direction and type Flows 0–8 (See Figure 4.3)
delay goes through all levels shown, which leads to roughly corresponding increases
in the throughput the gateways must handle. As with the basic tests, the hop interval
alternates between 500 ms and 50 ms to see if the additional IP calculation load
impacts the maximum rate. Flow 4 is used across all runs to because it utilizes both
TCP and UDP traffic flowing in all valid directions. RTT is set to 20 ms.
Table 4.2: Factor levels for throughput tests
Factor Possible Levels
Hop interval (ms) 500, 50
Round-trip latency (ms) 20
Packet delay (s) 0.2, 0.1, 0.05, 0.01, 0.005, 0.001
Traffic direction and type Flow 4 (See Figure 4.3)
• Minimum hop interval
Table 4.3 displays the factor levels used for this series of tests. This sequence
determines the minimum time between IP address changes at various latencies. The
hop interval and latency go through the levels shown in a full factorial fashion (every
46
latency-hop interval combination). Packet rate is fixed at 0.3 seconds. Flow 4 is used
throughout.
Table 4.3: Factor levels for minimum hop interval tests
Factor Possible Levels
Hop interval (ms) 1000, 500, 300, 200, 100, 75, 60, 50, 40, 30, 15, 10, 5
Round-trip latency (ms) 0, 30, 100, 500
Packet delay (s) 0.3
Traffic direction and type Flow 4 (See Figure 4.3)
• Fuzzer
Table 4.4 displays the factor levels used for this series of tests. This sequence
is not tested rigorously for traffic flow success and failure, but ensures that ARG
remains stable despite malformed traffic. Traffic Flow 8 is used, with additional
traffic coming from fuzzers running that replay and/or alter all gateway traffic they
see. Hop intervals vary between 500 ms and 50 ms, latency is fixed at 20 ms, and
packets are sent at 0.3 second intervals.
Table 4.4: Factor levels for fuzz tests
Factor Possible Levels
Hop interval (ms) 500, 50
Round-trip latency (ms) 20
Packet delay (s) 0.3
Traffic direction and type Flow 8 (See Figure 4.3)
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A 95% confidence interval is used for all experiments. Experiments are each run for
five minutes, sufficient time for the system to stabilize (pilot studies show that ARG fully
connects in under 10 seconds on the test network). Some variation is possible in the actual
traffic seen in a single run, so a minimum of 10 replications are used for each experiment.
4.9 Summary
This chapter discusses the goals of this research and defines the SUT and its relevant
factors. The methodology in use is covered, with details on the test network and the exact
tests run on this network. Finally, this chapter enumerates the metrics the tests collect and
analyze.
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Figure 4.3: Experiment traffic flow directions and protocols. Black solid lines indicate
valid traffic, red dashed lines are invalid.
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V. Results and Analysis
This chapter presents and analyzes the experimental results. Section 5.1 covers the
basic functionality tests, Section 5.2 determines the effects of hop interval and latency,
and Section 5.3 discusses ARG’s performance. Section 5.4 covers the results of running
a fuzzer against ARG. Finally, Section 5.5 revisits the research questions Chapter 4 poses
and summarizes the results with respect to each of them.
5.1 Basic Tests
The first set of experiments test the basic functionality of ARG, as Section 4.8
discusses. These tests are intended to verify the basic functionality of ARG and determine
if it classifies traffic correctly, per the expected traffic flow. Given that stressing the system
is not a goal of this series of tests, packet delay is set to a high value of 0.3 seconds, resulting
in a slow packet rate. (Packet rate stressing is left until the throughput tests in Section 5.3.)
Hop intervals vary between 50 milliseconds and 500 milliseconds, with a RTT fixed at 20
milliseconds.
5.1.1 Valid Packet Loss.
The raw results for the loss of valid packets on each test are shown in Figure 5.1.
Figure 5.2 shows the mean and confidence intervals (CIs) of each test, using a 95%
confidence level. Due to a lack of normality in the experimental results, these numbers
are calculated via bootstrapping with 1000 replicates.
These figures reveal low packet loss across all test scenarios. At worst, Flow 3—
TCP traffic between ARG protected clients only—lost between 0.0588% and 0.7544% of
packets, with 95% confidence. Across all tests, valid packet loss averaged 0.1123%, with a
CI of (0.0659%, 0.1478%), again with 95% confidence. These results confirm Chapter 4’s
hypothesis that ARG causes packet loss less than 2%, at least under normal conditions.
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Figure 5.1: Basic tests, raw valid packet loss. Traffic flow numbers correspond to the flows
in Figure 4.3.
Figure 5.1 displays two outliers on Flow 3. Examining the data reveals the dropped
packets exceeded the maximum size of a packet ARG can pass between gateways. As
Chapter 3 covers, ARG wraps packets between gateways in its own headers, increasing the
size of the packet. Ethernet II has a default maximum transmission unit of 1500 bytes, so
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Figure 5.2: Basic tests, valid packet loss means and confidence intervals. Traffic flow
numbers correspond to the flows in Figure 4.3
ARG drops packets that pass this limit after being wrapped (ARG is unable to fragment
packets or inform the sender that fragmentation is needed, as Section 6.3 mentions). In
fact, the maximum packet size issue is the most common reason for packet rejection in
the basic set of tests (in tests with only valid traffic), as shown in Table 5.1. While test
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traffic is controlled for size, an oversight in the test traffic generators fails to account for
TCP options, which can increase the size of the packet beyond the limit. TCP options here
refers to the optional header data after the main TCP headers [Pos81].
Table 5.1: Basic tests 1-4 packet rejection reasons. 143 tests with 2,312,228 total packets
represented.
Reason Count % of Total Packets
Outbound message too long 949 0.04104%
Outbound sequence number incorrect 596 0.02578%
Inbound unwrapped 578 0.025%
Unknown 518 0.0224%
Outbound gateway not connected 393 0.017%
Inbound NAT bucket not found 173 0.007482%
Inbound gateway not connected 78 0.003373%
Inbound bad protocol 57 0.002465%
Inbound source IP incorrect 30 0.001297%
Inbound destination IP incorrect 6 0.0002595%
Inbound ping accepted 3 0.0001297%
Lost on wire 2 0.0000865%
Outbound rewrite 1 0.00004325%
Other entries in this table deserve some discussion. The next most common reason,
incorrect sequence numbers, indicates that ARG’s replay protection mechanism blocked
packets. This commonly occurs at initialization, resulting in an average of 4 sequence
number issues per test over the course of 143 tests, one for each gateway. The third entry
on the list, “Inbound Unwrapped,” occurs at the end of a test, where the receiver of a packet
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is shutdown before the sender. The results processor traces packets through the network
using a combination of packet captures and text log files of actions on each host. When a
test run ends, these utilities shutdown sequentially. If a host sends a packet to a gateway
that is still recording packet captures but has already shutdown its application-level receiver
script (which creates the text log files), the test processor returns the last message it saw
regarding the packet, which is typically whatever action the gateway took. Appendix F
covers the test processor in more detail. The end-of-test issues are also the case for the
“outbound rewrite,” “ping accepted,” and “unknown” entries. The remainder of the reasons
are self explanatory.
A resampling of the data between the two hop intervals used in the basic tests gives
a p-value of 0.639, indicating little significant difference between the two hop intervals.
This confirms that hop interval in and of itself does not affect losses on the network, an
important fact when considering the minimum hop interval in Section 5.2.
5.1.2 Invalid Packet Loss.
Traffic Flows 5 through 8 include invalid traffic that ARG should reject and hence
should be “lost.” Table 5.2 displays the percentage of invalid traffic rejected (with 95%
CIs), clearly revealing ARG has an extremely low false negative rate. As shown, over the
course of 28 repetitions only one test appears to have allowed a single packet through.
Table 5.2: Basic tests, packet loss of invalid traffic
Flow Mean CI Replications
Flow 5 100% (100%, 100%) 28
Flow 6 100% (100%, 100%) 28
Flow 7 100% (100%, 100%) 28
Flow 8 100% (99.99%, 99.99%) 28
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Flow 8 shows a small deviation from the expected 100% packet rejection, as 1 of
746 packets made it through, but further examination of this number shows a rare post-
processing problem. If two identical packets are sent at the same time, the test run processor
leaves the second one unmarked, which is interpreted later as successfully received. The
problem lies with the log analyzer, not ARG itself, which did in fact reject every packet.
This result offers convincing evidence that ARG effectively blocks unexpected inbound
traffic, but it gives no indication of its suitability against more focused attacks.
Table 5.3: Basic tests 5-8 packet rejection reasons. 112 tests with 1,268,746 total packets
represented.
Reason Count % of Total Packets
Inbound NAT bucket not found 60,884 4.799%
Inbound unwrapped 687 0.05415%
Outbound message too long 486 0.03831%
Unknown 340 0.0268%
Outbound sequence number incorrect 242 0.01907%
Inbound source IP incorrect 14 0.001103%
Inbound ping accepted 5 0.0003941%
Additionally, Table 5.3 illustrates that packets are rejected via the NAT table quite
frequently over the 112 test runs with invalid traffic. This operation costs the gateway
minimal processing time, as it can reject after a single hash table lookup. Fast decisions on
packets lower the possibility of an effective Denial of Service (DOS) attack, as the Central
Processing Unit (CPU) can continue to transform valid traffic. Section 5.1.1 discusses the
meaning of the remainder of this table.
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5.2 Minimum Hop Interval
The minimum hop interval sequence of tests measures the change in packet loss at
specific latencies as the time between hops decreases. For these tests, a fixed packet rate
and Flow 4 are always used. Section 4.8 covers the specifics of these tests. The figures
below document the results of the tests, broken up by traffic type and direction.
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Figure 5.3: Hop interval tests, packet loss of UDP and TCP traffic between ARG networks.
Note: X axis is not linear.
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Figure 5.4: Hop interval tests, scaled view of packet loss between ARG networks
Figure 5.3 displays the results of the hop interval tests, separated by network latency.
Figure 5.4 displays the same numbers, but with a much tighter Y scale to reveal differences
at large hop intervals. The numbers shown here only include packets sent between ARG-
protected clients; traffic to the external host and administrative packets between gateways
are not included (packets to external hosts are considered separately later). The highest
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standard deviation in any of the hop interval-latency groups is 2.2238, implying the
potential for significant (but still potentially acceptable) variation in network performance.
Interestingly, the zero millisecond latency trials exhibit a noticeably different decline
than the others, with zero milliseconds giving a relatively steady decline in packet loss and
the others remaining relatively flat before a rapid drop. The 15 millisecond latency curve
gives a hint the shapes may not be as different as they appear, as it shows two or three
mid-way data points on the way down to acceptable packet loss. With tests against more
hop intervals, these curves would likely show a more gradual (although still rapid) decline.
Chapter 4 hypothesizes that packet loss reaches acceptable levels when the time
between hops is equal to (or exceeds) the one-way network latency. Theoretically, this
time frame should allow a packet to cross the network from one gateway to another before
the receiver changes IP addresses twice, even if the packet is sent just before the receiver
hops the first time (as mentioned in Chapter 3, gateways accept packets at the current
and previous IP). Any shorter hop interval results in a period of time before each hop
that guarantees sent packets arrive too late. Figure 5.4, however, shows that loss drops
below 2% when the hop interval is around four times the latency. This difference from the
anticipated behavior is likely the result of the test environment.
As Section 2.1.3 discusses, Ethernet uses ARP requests and responses to determine
the source and destination for packets on the local network. In the test environment, the
gateways and the external host are all on the same local network. This results in extra
Ethernet ARP requests and responses, when compared to operation over the Internet. On a
normal Ethernet segment with minimal latency (the zero millisecond test), the ARP process
takes minimal time and has little impact on operation. To speed the process even further,
ARP data is cached, so when a system wants to send to the same IP again, it references the
ARP cache table and does not have to go through the request-response process again. With
short hop intervals, however, gateways frequently need to send to different IP addresses and
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therefore must send and receive the requisite ARPs very frequently (generally, once every
hop). When the network latency is not zero, these additional frames can cause significant
delays. Figure 5.5 illustrates what happens when a time synchronization between gateways
occurs with a five millisecond one-way latency.
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Figure 5.5: Time synchronization process, including ARPs
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If there is no need for these ARP requests (or they were negligible, time-wise),
the entire time synchronization process completes in 10 milliseconds. Because ARPs
on the test network experience the same delay as UDP and TCP packets, however, it
takes 30 milliseconds to synchronize times. The time base for the other gateway is
calculated correctly despite the extra delay because the latency of that particular packet
is taken into account. Later packets may take a wide variety of latencies, however,
because they may not require any ARPs, only one direction might require it, or both
directions may require it. For a 5 millisecond one-way latency, this leads to variations
of 5, 10, or 15 milliseconds, an acceptable and tolerable range. By the time tests get to
set latencies of 250 milliseconds, one-way latencies range from 250 to 750 milliseconds,
with RTTs of up to 1500 milliseconds. This degree of variation is difficult to compensate
for, leading to significant packet loss until the hop interval exceeds three times the set
latency. Additionally, at shorter hop intervals the triple-latency problem is encountered
more frequently, as the ARP cache must be refreshed more often.
On the Internet, the triple-latency problem does not occur. An ARG gateway sending
a packet to another gateway uses ARP requests to get the hardware address of the local
router, a process which takes under a millisecond on most Ethernet networks. Once the
ARG gateway has the hardware address of the router, it sends the data packet out to the
other gateway. After the packet leaves the local network, IP address hopping does not
affect network operation at all, resulting in the packets between gateways experiencing
same latency as any other data on the network. A 30 millisecond one-way latency across the
Internet (or other Wide Area Network (WAN)) means packets genuinely take (on average)
30 milliseconds to reach their destination, whereas a 30 millisecond latency on the test
network often means packets take 90 milliseconds.
Despite having no latency, the zero millisecond test exhibits high loss until around
75 milliseconds hops, similar to when the 15 millisecond latency test indicates a usable
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connection. This may indicate that hopping more frequently than every 50-75 milliseconds
is impractical regardless of network conditions with the current implementation. It may
be possible for the sender of a packet to calculate “future” IP addresses to use for each
packet sent, so that the addresses are current when they arrive at the destination. This is
an area for future research, as Section 6.3 discusses. Previous research into address space
randomization and IP hopping limit themselves to hopping on the order of minutes or hours
and never explore the maximum rate possible.
ARG appears to have little additional impact on TCP, when compared to UDP.
Figure 5.6 displays losses associated with only TCP packets travelling between gateways.
Compared to Figure 5.3 (which includes UDP and TCP packets), trends appear similar.
Table 5.4 shows the packet rejection reasons for all hop interval tests. As expected, far
and away the most common rejection reason for this set of tests is incorrect source and/or
destination IPs. Other entries in this table are discussed in Section 5.1.1.
Finally, Figure 5.7 demonstrates there is little correlation between the hop interval and
the flow of traffic to external hosts. Over all 612 hop interval test runs, packet loss to and
from the external host never exceeds 0.059%. This makes sense, as the changing IP is only
referenced when the NAT module first creates a table entry. Later packets on the same
connection consult the table information and are unaware of any IP address changes.
5.3 Maximum Packet Rate
The final numerical test performed against ARG measures the maximum packet rate
it is capable of supporting. For these tests, latency is set to 20 milliseconds and Flow 4 is
used. Hop intervals vary between 50 ms and 500 ms to check if this has an effect on the
supported packet rate. Most importantly, traffic generators are run with steadily increasing
send rates. Section 4.8 contains more details. Because throughput varies somewhat on each
run, the data is clustered into the groupings listed in Table 5.5 and colored in Figure 5.8.
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Figure 5.6: Hop interval tests, packet loss of TCP traffic between ARG networks
Figure 5.8 shows the raw data from these tests, with colors indicating the 7 K-
means clusters, grouped by bit-wise throughput. Clusters are chosen via the Hartigan and
Wong algorithm, with 500 random starts. This graph includes all packets on the network.
Visually, the plot reveals fairly similar loss in each cluster, although some clusters exhibit
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Table 5.4: Hop interval test loss reasons. 612 tests with 15,387,651 total packets
represented.
Reason Count % of Total Packets
Inbound destination IP incorrect 506,075 3.289%
Inbound source IP incorrect 165,656 1.077%
Inbound unwrapped 4,935 0.03207%
Unknown 4,235 0.02752%
Outbound message too long 4,106 0.02668%
Outbound sequence number incorrect 2,180 0.01417%
Outbound gateway not connected 1,000 0.006499%
Inbound NAT bucket not found 110 0.0007149%
Inbound bad protocol 94 0.0006109%
Inbound gateway not connected 14 0.00009098%
Outbound wrapped 12 0.00007798%
Inbound ping accepted 10 0.00006499%
Inbound connection data received 1 0.000006499%
a fair amount of variation. A Tukey test with each cluster confirms this result, as shown in
Figure 5.9.
On Figure 5.9, numbers along the side correspond to the cluster numbers shown in
Table 5.5 and Figure 5.8. Six means stand out as being distinctly different: 1-4, 2-4, 3-
4, 4-5, 4-6, and 4-7. Cluster 4 is statistically different from all other clusters, with 95%
confidence. However, the other data gives reason to believe that throughput was not the
cause of loss increase and variation. No changing trend is seen in any of the surrounding
throughputs’ losses (either up or down) and faster throughputs (Clusters 5 through 7) show
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Figure 5.7: Hop interval tests, packet loss of externally-bound traffic
loss comparable to the slower throughputs (Clusters 1 through 3). While the precise cause
of the increased loss in some of these tests is unknown, the amount of data the gateways
handle is not believed to be the cause.
The results of these tests are limited to just the implementation of ARG and imply
only a minimally possible throughput. Despite these limitations, ARG performs well with
64
Table 5.5: Packet rate clusters
Clust Mean (Kbps) Min (Kbps) Max (Kbps)
1 485.1 300.3 573.7
2 854.5 782 980.3
3 1401 1190 1581
4 2223 1969 2421
5 3250 3243 3264
6 3796 3778 3814
7 4374 4351 4389
reasonably rapid traffic of over four Mbps, giving no reason to believe it is not capable of
higher rates. Time constraints prohibit more rapid throughput tests.
5.4 Fuzzing Test
The final series of tests run on ARG consist of sending invalid and replayed traffic to
the gateways. The primary objective is to verify that ARG remains stable and able to pass
valid traffic while under attack.
The custom run-processing tool this thesis uses to generate packet loss statistics is
unable to process the logs from the malicious traffic generators, making it difficult to
determine precisely what occurs in each run. This calls into question the accuracy of the
results from the run processor. Nonetheless, the tool reports a mean packet loss between
21.8% and 23.5% (with 95% confidence), which indicates ARG experiences significant
difficulty when faced with malicious traffic. A manual examination of log files does seem
to indicate this is the case, with some traffic successfully traversing the network but a huge
amount being rejected.
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Figure 5.8: Packet rate tests, clustered loss verses throughput
Despite the high losses, ARG does appear to remain stable throughout the barrage.
In all cases, ARG never crashes and maintains around the same ability to handle valid
traffic (that is, although the losses appear high, they remain consistent throughout). Further
research is needed to identify the causes behind the high losses, but the problem likely lies
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Figure 5.9: Packet rate tests, Tukey test against clustered data
in implementation and not architecture. Even if ARG crashes, traffic flow entirely stops,
preventing the attacker from penetrating the network.
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5.5 Overall Analysis
Chapter 4 presents several questions that this research attempts to answer. Each is
revisited below along with an accompanying conclusion. More details on each answer may
be found in earlier sections of this chapter.
1. Does ARG classify traffic correctly?
Overall, ARG does classify traffic correctly. Throughout the testing, no actual false
negatives occurred, indicating ARG’s NAT system is robust and provides a solid way
to classify invalid inbound traffic. However, the traffic used to test this system is
fairly benign and does not intentionally attempt to circumvent ARG. Testing needs
to be done with a more intelligent threat.
For expected traffic on the network, whether it is between ARG-protected networks
or to external hosts, ARG is reasonably accurate. In basic tests involving a range of
traffic types, ARG averaged less than 0.1123% loss of valid, expected traffic. This
falls well below Chapter 4’s definition of “acceptable loss” of 2%. Based on this,
ARG accurately classifies traffic.
2. What is the maximum packet rate ARG can handle?
The testing done for this research did not find an upper limit on the amount of traffic
ARG could handle, with the gateways showing the capability of handling over 4.3
Mbps with no statistically significant change in packet loss.
3. What is the minimum supportable time between hops? How does latency affect this?
When ARG operates on a network with a one-way latency less than 15 milliseconds,
hops may occur every 50 to 75 milliseconds and still maintain a viable communi-
cation channel (losses are less than 2%). Beyond this point, packets begin flowing
smoothly when the time between hops exceeds four times the latency. However,
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there is reason to believe hops could be faster in a real-world deployment, due to the
test network factors Section 5.2 discusses. This is a significant contribution because
previous research focuses on address changes on the order of minutes or hours, rather
than multiple times a second.
Realistically, network latencies vary wildly. However, ARG allows flexibility in
setting the hop interval for every gateway separately and could be easily expanded
to allow gateways to change the hop intervals they use between each other while
leaving the rate used for others alone. Section 6.3 discusses this in more depth.
This flexibility allows networks with low-latency networks to hop frequently and
high-latency networks to hop more slowly. The results here provide guidance on the
maximum hop interval to chose based on network conditions.
4. Is ARG stable when presented with corrupt, malformed, or replayed packets?
ARG is stable in the face of bad traffic. Long-running fuzz tests do not cause ARG to
crash, nor do they permanently break traffic flow. However, malformed traffic does
appear to have an impact on valid packet loss, based on both automated analysis and
a manual inspection. The cause of this needs exploration to determine the correct fix.
5.6 Summary
This chapter analyzes the results for each test (Figure 4.3) sequence, each broken out
into its own section. An overall analysis in context of the original research questions is then
presented, summarizing the findings of this thesis.
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VI. Conclusions and Recommendations
This chapter summarizes the work and findings of this research. Section 6.1
summarizes the conclusions reached. Section 6.2 discusses the impact of this research.
Section 6.3 provides recommendations for future work in the network address space
randomization area in general and on ARG itself.
6.1 Research Conclusions
This research demonstrates that IP hopping is a suitable method of blocking
unexpected external traffic while maintaining a minimal false-positive rate. This can be
done completely transparently from the perspective of the internal and external hosts; the
tool this thesis presents works with no configuration changes to any host other than the
gateway.
In addition, ARG proves rapid IP address changes are possible, with network latency
as the primary limiter. Tests demonstrate that—under this implementation—IP addresses
may change around 15 times per second (changes every 50 to 75 milliseconds) and still
allow for reliable communication.
ARG also demonstrates good throughput, a critical aspect of usability to a real
network. Test rates reach four Mbps with no indication that ARG is unable to handle greater
rates. Running a fuzzer against ARG found that, while gateways themselves remain stable
in the face of malformed traffic, the attack may have an impact on connectivity and valid
packet loss.
6.2 Research Impact
This thesis presents a new IP address hopping tool that combines features of previous
efforts in this area. Through a gateway-based solution, ARG avoids requiring changes to
existing network architecture or any clients inside. ARG applies IP address changes to all
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packets entering and leaving the network and packets between ARG-protected networks
include full encryption and authentication.
Of primary importance to this field of research is the demonstration that IP address
changes may occur multiple times per second. Previous research focuses on changes on
the order of minutes or hours and may kill on-going connections when address changes
occur. ARG’s design allows for connections to persist across hops without participation of
either end of the stream, ultimately allowing for much more frequent address changes and
a potential amplification of the benefits of address space randomization.
6.3 Future Work
6.3.1 IPv6 Support.
IPv6 support is slowly becoming a requirement for any network system. For an IP
hopping system, IPv6 offers the benefit of a greatly increased address space, allowing
systems to hop in a much broader range of addresses. ARG is entirely IPv4 in its current
implementation and cannot transport IPv6 packets to external hosts or to other gateways.
6.3.2 Fragmentation Support.
ARG currently has neither support for fragmenting packets as they pass through
the gateway nor for notifying the sender that fragmentation is needed. Packets to and
from external hosts pose no problem, as the original sender will handle this themselves.
However, packets between gateways/ARG-protected networks have additional data added,
potentially exceeding the maximum transmission unit of the network. In this case, ARG
has no way to recover and the packet is permanently dropped without notice. A more
complete implementation should notify the sender that fragmentation is needed.
6.3.3 More Extensive Malicious Testing.
Due to time constraints, a full battery of robust malicious tests could not be performed
against ARG. As demonstrated by the basic fuzz testing, ARG handles errors without
becoming unstable, but may lose additional packets. The reasons behind this potential
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issue needs more exploration to determine the root cause and what should be done to fix it.
More extensive work in both undirected (i.e., fuzz testing) and directed attacks is needed.
For example, malicious hosts might attempt to falsely connect to a gateway or perform
replay attacks in a more intelligent manner.
6.3.4 More Intelligent NAT.
ARG currently blindly opens holes in the NAT when it sees outbound packets and
closes them after seeing no activity for a fixed amount of time. A transport layer
examination would allow more fine-grained NAT work, by watching for actual connection
establishment and teardown packets.
6.3.5 Integration with Other Defenses.
Network defenses often perform better when working in tandem. ARG has the
potential to detect certain types of probes into the network. If this information can be
passed off to an IDS, it might alert an operator or take other defense actions on the network.
In an even more active approach, ARG might work with a honeypot to present a fake view
of the network to an attacker. By examining what systems an attacker probes, it might be
possible to determine the identity of the adversary, their goals, and their intended target in
the network, all valuable information to those defending the network.
6.3.6 Latency Compensation.
The current design of ARG exhibits problems transferring packets when the hop
interval is less than four times the latency. This situation is easy to detect, as latency
between the gateways is already being calculated. To enable more flexibility with varying
network conditions, gateways could change their hop interval on an individual basis to
match the network conditions to every other gateway with which they connect. For
example, say there are gateways GateA, GateB, and GateC. The latency between GateA
and GateB is 50 ms, the latency between GateB and GateC is 40 ms, and the latency
between GateA and GateC is 200 ms. By default, they each hop every 200 ms. When they
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perform time synchronization, GateA and GateC would detect the high latency and change
the hop interval for just each other to 600 ms, but leave their hop interval at 200 ms for
GateB.
Alternatively (or perhaps in addition), it would be possible to send packets with IP
addresses “in the future,” so that when they arrive at their destination the addresses would
be current. That is, when a gateway is about to send a packet to another gateway, it
calculates the addresses based on the current time + latency, rather than just the current
time. This relies on network latency being relatively stable, as sudden drops in the latency
would cause packets to contain future addresses when they arrive at the receiver.
6.4 Summary
This chapter reviews the work and findings of this thesis. The impact of the research
is discussed and recommendations for future work are given.
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Appendix A: IP Packet Structure
Table A.1: IP packet structure
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Appendix B: ARG Protocol
This appendix details the format of each ARG message type. Section B.1 presents the
structure of each message type. Section B.2 gives the steps of each exchange type and their
effect on the gateway’s state.
B.1 Message Formats
The base header for the ARG protocol is given in Table 3.4. Four possible payloads
are delivered under this header: WRAPPED, PING, CONN REQ/CONN RESP, and TRUST DATA.
The format for each is shown in individual sections below.
B.1.1 WRAPPED.
Use: Transfer packets between ARG-protected networks.
This message type contains no additional information. After the original packet is
encrypted, it is used as the payload to the ARG header as-is.
Table B.1: Data in ARG WRAPPED message
Data Size Data Type
Packet Data - Raw, encrypted packet
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B.1.2 PING.
Use: Time synchronization between two gateways. See Section B.2.2.
Table B.2: Data in ARG PING message
Data Size Data Type
Request ID 4 bytes Unsigned Integer
Response ID 4 bytes Unsigned Integer
Time Offset 4 bytes Unsigned Integer
B.1.3 CONN REQ/CONN RESP.
Use: Connect to other gateways.
Note that these message types are formatted identically. The only difference is the
message type number used, as this allows gateways to determine when it is a request for
new data or just a response to a previous request.
Table B.3: Data in ARG CONN REQ and CONN RESP messages
Data Size Data Type
Symmetric Key 32 bytes Raw
Initialization Vector (IV) 32 bytes Raw
Hop Key 16 bytes Raw
Hop Interval 4 bytes Unsigned Integer
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B.1.4 TRUST DATA.
Use: Allow on-the-fly addition of new gateways.
Table B.4: Data in ARG TRUST DATA message
Data Size Data Type
Gate Name 10 bytes Null-padded String
Base IP 4 bytes Unsigned Integer
Mask 4 bytes Unsigned Integer
N 130 bytes Raw
E 10 bytes Raw
B.2 Protocol Exchanges
The steps for each exchange are given in the sections below. In the following
descriptions, local is the initiating gateway in a given exchange and remote is another
gateway with which it is communicating.
B.2.1 Connect process.
1. Local sends CONN REQ containing its hop key, hop interval, and symmetric key.
2. After validating the packet, remote saves the connection data. If time synchronization
data is available for local, then remote marks it as connected. If it is not available,
remote schedules a time synchronization request.
3. Remote sends CONN RESP acknowledgment back, containing its own hop key, hop
interval, and symmetric key.
4. Local receives, validates, and saves the data from remote.
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5. Local marks the remote gateway as having connection data and marks remote as
connected or schedules a time sync, as appropriate.
B.2.2 Time synchronization.
1. Local sends PING containing random 4-byte unsigned integer in the Request ID
field (see Table B.2), null (0) in Response ID, and its time offset in Time Offset,
which is the difference between the current time and its base time.
2. Local notes the time it sent the request.
3. Remote validates the message and responds with a new PING, giving a new random
request integer, the received response int (from local) set to the request int, and its
own time offset.
4. Local ensures received response integer matches the request integer it sent.
5. Local determines the connection’s round-trip latency from the send time, then
remote’s time base is calculated based on half of this. That is,
remote time base = received time offset −
latency
2
This value is saved and used in IP calculations for the remote gateway in the future.
6. Local marks the remote gateway as having time sync data available and, if connection
data is available, remote is marked as connected. If connection data is not available,
local schedules a connect process.
7. Local sends a response to remote, with Request ID set to 0, Response ID set to
the value remote sent in its request, and Time Offset set as in step 1. This second
PING send from local is necessary because remote does not know the latency of the
initial request.
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8. Remote receives and validates the final response, saves the data, and marks local
as connected if connection data is already available (or schedules a connection data
request if needed).
B.2.3 Trust Data Exchange.
1. For each gateway it knows about, local sends a TRUST DATA packet to remote,
containing the gateway name, base IP, IP mask, and public key to the remote gateway.
Each packet covers one gateway, with no data about the local or remote gateways
included.
2. Remote validates the message, then adds the data in each TRUST DATA packet to their
list of gateways (if they do not already have it). At this point the new gateway appears
just like one read in from a configuration file.
3. Within two seconds, remote attempts to connect to the new gateway, just as they
would any other gateway they had not yet successfully contacted.
B.2.4 Route packet.
1. Local receives a packet on its internal interface.
2. Local takes the outbound packet and encrypts with with remote symmetric key. Local
determines the destination gateway based on IP range.
3. Local sends WRAPPED message to remote current IP with the encrypted packet
included. An HMAC of the packet (encrypted data and headers) is included in the
header.
4. Remote receives and validates the message.
5. Remote sends the original, decrypted packet into the internal network.
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Appendix C: ARG Testing
This appendix covers the steps used to run a test. The events shown below occur in
order for each test.
1. Set time on all hosts to be the as similar as possible (used for post-processing only).
2. Set artificial network latency on external interfaces of gates.
3. Start tcpdump on each host. Gateways have two instances started, one for each
interface. The exact commands with the appropriate traffic filters appear in Table
C.1.
Table C.1: Test run tcpdump calls
Host Command
Gateway sudo tcpdump -i eth2 -w gateX-inner.pcap -n ip and not arp
sudo tcpdump -i eth1 -w gateX-outer.pcap -n ip and not arp
Prot/Ext sudo tcpdump -i eth1 -w clientX.pcap -n ip and not arp
4. Set ARP cache size on gateways and external host to allow for 65,536 entries. This
is needed at short hop intervals only because all systems are on the same network
segment.
5. Push configuration files for ARG. ProtA1 and ProtC1 each know about ProtB1,
but not about each other. ProtB1 is given configuration files for both ProtA1 and
ProtC1.
6. Start ARG on the gateways.
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7. Start traffic generators on hosts, as appropriate for the test being run. See Section 4.8
for general flow of traffic for each test type.
8. Wait for the test to finish. For all tests discussed in this thesis, tests run for five
minutes.
9. Stop traffic generators.
10. Stop ARG.
11. Stop traffic collectors (tcpdump).
12. Retrieve log and pcap files from every host into a directory.
After the logs are collected together, the run is processed by a separate script,
process run.py. See Appendix F for details on its use.
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Appendix D: ARG Building and Configuration
This appendix documents everything needed to use ARG. Section D.1 covers the build
environment needed to build ARG from source. Section D.2 documents calling ARG and
creating the necessary configuration files.
D.1 Building
ARG runs on Ubuntu 12.04 and 12.10. Other versions and distributions are untested,
although they may work if the below requirements are met.
D.1.1 Required Packages.
• gcc >=4
• linux-headers 3.5.0
• Autoconf >=2.69
• Automake >=1.11
• libtool >=2.4.2
• libpcap-dev >=1.3.0
• libpolarssl-dev >=1.1.4
• libpthread-dev >= 1.1.1
In Ubuntu:
1 $ sudo apt-get install automake autoconf build-essential \
libtool libpcap-dev libpolarssl -dev
D.1.2 Compilation.
From the ARG source directory:
1 $ ./autogen.sh
2 $ make
This should produce two executables, arg and gen gate config.
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D.2 Usage
D.2.1 Command Line.
ARG must be run as root. Usage is straightforward:
$ sudo ./arg <conf file>
A path to a configuration file is required. The path should point to the main
configuration file, with supporting files in the same directory as the main one. See Section
D.2.2 for more details.
ARG will start up and configure itself, then after a brief delay attempt to connect to
other gateways for which it has configuration information. To end ARG’s execution at any
time, press ctrl-c to cleanly kill it or send it SIGTERM via kill (i.e. sudo killall \
-SIGTERM arg) to end it without cleaning up.
D.2.2 Configuration Files.
ARG requires at least three separate configuration files on start up, plus one for every
gateway it should have initial knowledge about. The main configuration file may be called
anything and contains four lines:
Listing D.1: main.conf
1 gateA
2 eth2
3 eth1
4 1000ms
In order, these are: gate name, internal network interface, external network interface,
and hop interval. Hop interval must be given in milliseconds.
In the same directory as the main configuration file must be two files giving details on
the local gateway called <gatename>.pub and <gatename>.priv. The private file (.priv)
gives the full private key of a gateway, while the public file (.pub) contains the public key,
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the base IP address of the gate, and the corresponding netmask. Examples of each are given
in Listings D.2 and D.3.
Listing D.2: gate.pub
172.1.0.1
255.255.0.0
N = 9F6BA2C9BD3717D591B1E52256ACFB43DB2EDF010E0312611273\
D4D327B215CFF87A1F04882559C49E61CA2D35E93B71D3950E4D\
FA64A0F80D2B670D83C555D24E25EA38CD9BED14A8BD0FF05A36\
649EDD64486E18521ABF695FA278A28303C50C89A91A4860A685\
F961C45A4BE2CE3011F1B78C741FE9508595254DE336AF43
E = 010001
Listing D.3: gate.priv
N = 9F6BA2C9BD3717D591B1E52256ACFB43DB2EDF010E0312611273\
D4D327B215CFF87A1F04882559C49E61CA2D35E93B71D3950E4D\
FA64A0F80D2B670D83C555D24E25EA38CD9BED14A8BD0FF05A36\
649EDD64486E18521ABF695FA278A28303C50C89A91A4860A685\
F961C45A4BE2CE3011F1B78C741FE9508595254DE336AF43
E = 010001
D = 4C2A31A12ECC768FABC7115101962D89B2DB46E20B1EBE963029\
B5019912854752508E272D20A32DC3F9B68D3917903606BF4D11\
4652F370EF61D01F6DD846F2AC0137C22A0C33014860AC68F7DF\
FC7F524B5D70FDA37530B06DFA518DCEDCF08537D4AB6DE5969C\
13E143E6DF2C6DD3145B4E4FF9306BDCD209A3F66C5C3F81
P = E154E78FFFC51AAABA4BE0B5F9123366962612EBB8AB17008A0A\
6367AB9C7A33ECEFCD807C8414CC56AC7678BE14604F13F9D66A\
B754C26E91ED30B18EE76283
Q = B51E3A12CED999F234DEF316888AC624D65DFDCFA93DC40FABCF\
84
70784057ADF27751A1B0103049AA0C4C89C92A081C774425F440\
D5C4A4B18CE984E8B93EE441
DP = D159C9FECEDA78E93046F912F8C3014089B5FC1447B1A5A059A\
04734F58B5F3A49238F6195CE3D68900A91D3A27E59F07E95BBB\
1D07D0E5C1E7629AC7E21DA33
DQ = 9421B9BBA24464DDAD125FDD2125E7333FC4B60EFECB8EAC868\
7EDE3DC341A07C24118ADE83FA63017490E34625529FAFDD8D0F\
1AA24DFD27B7E8E7ECCEBBC41
QP = AA199F9F8C0EB3FEA2DB83EA22134576E9B9C8DD7C4B78D8CE4\
2011E56EFAECF8A4C8AFE19F2F6E76B5B41C73D0B7F90B8FA1D0\
04C2539060FAE762019D6F990
The first two lines of the public key file are, in order, the base IP address and mask for
the gateway. The remainder of the parameters are hexadecimal integer values matching to
parts of the RSA equations. The library used for encryption in ARG (PolarSSL) provides
a straightforward way of reading these into the internal key structures. The exact details of
each value are not overly important, as the public and private key files files can be produced
quickly through the included gen gate config utility. This tool is built alongside arg,
see Section D.1. Usage is:
1 $ ./gen_gate_config <name> <base ip> <mask>
This will produce a <name>.pub and <name>.priv file with the information given
and a random public and private key.
For reference, N and E in both of configuration files come from the RSA encryption
equation c ≡ me(mod n). The values D, P, and Q in the private key file represent the original
key generation values, as shown in the equations n = pq and d ≡ e−1(mod φ(n)). The
remainder of the values are multiplied forms of the the previous values (e.g., DP is D × P).
85
For every gateway that this gate should know about, another <othegatename>.pub
should be placed in the directory. For instance, if gateA knows about gateB, then a
gateB.pub file must exist. The information inside is the same format as its own .pub
file. Look at Section D.3 for an example of the file structure and expected output.
D.3 ARG Execution Example
In this example ARG is being run on gateA and only knows about gateB.
Listing D.4: ARG Execution Example
1 $ ls
2 arg conf
3 $ ls conf
4 gateA.pub gateA.priv gateB.pub main-gateA.conf
5 $ sudo ./arg conf/main-gateA.conf
6 1355979615.731 LOG4 Starting at 20 Dec 2012 00:00:15
7 1355979615.731 LOG4 Reading from configuration file \
conf/main-gateA.conf
8 1355979615.731 LOG4 Found public key for gate gateA
9 1355979615.731 LOG4 Found public key for gate gateB
10 1355979615.731 LOG4 Hopper init
11 1355979615.731 LOG4 Locating configuration for gateA
12 1355979615.731 LOG4 Configured as gateA
13 1355979615.731 LOG4 Generating hop and symmetric encryption \
keys
14 1355979615.731 LOG4 Hop rate set to 1000ms
15 1355979615.733 LOG4 Hopper initialized
16 1355979615.733 LOG4 NAT init
17 1355979615.733 LOG4 NAT initialized
18 1355979615.733 LOG4 Director init
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19 1355979615.733 LOG2 Internal device is eth2, external is eth1
20 1355979615.733 LOG4 NAT cleanup thread running
21 1355979615.733 LOG4 NAT Table empty
22 1355979615.735 LOG4 Using filter '(arp and not dst net \
172.1.0.0 mask 255.255.0.0) or (not arp and src net \
172.1.0.0 mask 255.255.0.0)' on eth2
23 1355979615.739 LOG4 Using filter '(arp and not src net \
172.1.0.0 mask 255.255.0.0 and dst net 172.1.0.0 mask \
255.255.0.0) or (not arp and dst net 172.1.0.0 mask \
255.255.0.0)' on eth1
24 1355979615.739 LOG2 Internal IP: 172.1.0.0, external IP: \
172.1.0.0, external mask: 255.255.0.0
25 1355979615.739 LOG4 Director initialized
26 1355979615.739 LOG4 Running
27 1355979615.739 LOG4 Starting connection/gateway auth thread
28 1355979615.739 LOG4 Connect thread running
29 1355979615.742 LOG4 Ready to receive packets on eth2
30 1355979615.765 LOG4 Ready to receive packets on eth1
31 1355979618.739 LOG4 Sending connect information to gateB
32 1355979618.740 LOG0 Outbound: Accept: Admin: connection data \
sent: /p:253 s:172.1.194.123:0 d:172.2.151.79:0 \
hash:8fb3b019948229847cd9e3adcd55fd90
33 ...
34 ˆC
35 1355979940.504 LOG4 Director uninit
36 1355979940.541 LOG4 Director finished
37 1355979940.541 LOG4 Shutting down
38 1355979940.541 LOG4 NAT uninit
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39 1355979940.542 LOG4 NAT finished
40 1355979940.542 LOG4 Hopper uninit
41 1355979940.542 LOG4 Removing all associated ARG networks
42 1355979940.542 LOG4 Hopper finished
43 1355979940.542 LOG4 Finished
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Appendix E: Traffic Generators
This appendix covers the required environment for the two traffic generators and their
usage. Section E.1 lists the required utilities to run the generators. Section E.2 discusses
usage of each generator and the available command line parameters.
E.1 Environment
The traffic generators run on Ubuntu 12.04, Ubuntu 12.10, and Mac OSX 10.8. Other
versions and distributions are untested, although they may work if the below requirements
are met.
The following packages must be available for gen traffic.py and malicious traffic.py
to run:
• Python 2.7
• python-scapy >=2.2.0
In Ubuntu:
1 $ sudo apt-get install python-libpcap python-scapy
E.2 Usage
E.2.1 Normal Traffic Generator.
gen traffic.py generates random TCP and UDP packets with the given character-
istics and rates. Table E.1 shows all the available options and the defaults where applicable.
The generator can be stopped by pressing Ctrl-c or sending it SIGTERM via kill.
E.2.2 Validation.
Validation is done manually on this tool by capturing the generated traffic on both the
sending and receiving hosts. Full packet logging may be done by the generator directly
(raw packets bytes were dumped), so a simple comparison between the sent traffic, the
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traffic it believes it generated, and the assigned settings ensure all parts of the tool operate
as expected.
E.2.2.1 Examples.
Send UDP traffic to 192.168.1.5:2000 twice a second:
1 $ ./gen_traffic.py -t udp -p 2000 -h 192.168.1.5 -d .5
2 1356728008.79 LOG4 START: Starting at 28 Dec 2012 15:53:28
3 1356728008.79 LOG4 Starting a valid UDP sender to \
192.168.1.5:2000
4 1356728008.79 LOG4 LOCAL ADDRESS: 192.168.1.115:2000
5 1356728009.29 LOG4 Sent valid \
17:dae8053de4050a230b106d763665f058 to 192.168.1.5:2000
6 1356728009.29 LOG4 Received valid \
17:f537a893140dbcc3b911cb69eae34b46 from 192.168.1.5:2000
7 1356728009.79 LOG4 Sent valid \
17:500b1c56df2e3d17ce50bda4e9be03c9 to 192.168.1.5:2000
8 ...
9 1356728011.81 LOG4 Sent valid \
17:f31dd5564b658e956fe74cc35c0f603f to 192.168.1.5:2000
10 1356728011.81 LOG4 Received valid \
17:ed8104a0ab9835fab38cc453362e8894 from 192.168.1.5:2000
11 ˆC1356728012.25 LOG4 User requested we stop
12 1356728012.25 LOG4 UDP sender to 192.168.1.5:2000 dying
Receive that UDP traffic:
1 $ ./gen_traffic.py -t udp -l -p 2000
2 1356727988.4 LOG4 START: Starting at 28 Dec 2012 15:53:08
3 1356727988.4 LOG4 Starting a UDP receiver on port 2000
4 1356727988.4 LOG4 LOCAL ADDRESS: 192.168.1.5:2000
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5 1356728009.29 LOG4 Received valid \
17:dae8053de4050a230b106d763665f058 from \
192.168.1.115:49958
6 1356728009.29 LOG4 Sent valid \
17:f537a893140dbcc3b911cb69eae34b46 to 192.168.1.115:49958
7 ...
8 1356728011.81 LOG4 Received valid \
17:f31dd5564b658e956fe74cc35c0f603f from \
192.168.1.115:49958
9 1356728011.81 LOG4 Sent valid \
17:ed8104a0ab9835fab38cc453362e8894 to 192.168.1.115:49958
10 ˆC1356728015.71 LOG4 User requested we stop
11 1356728015.71 LOG4 UDP listener on port 2000 dying
E.2.3 Malicious Traffic Generator.
malicious traffic.py generates malicious ARG traffic by replaying ARG pro-
tocol traffic with randomly chosen modifications. The possible modifications are shown
below. Each may be chosen with a 10% probability.
• Zero ARG signature/HMAC
• Change message type
• Zero data
• Remove the data
• Changed sequence number
• Changed source IP address
• Changed destination IP address
The only option available for malicious traffic.py is --output option. This has
the same effect as gen traffic.py’s and is covered in Table E.1.
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Table E.1: gen traffic.py command-line parameters
Parameter Description Possible Values Default
--type Type of traffic to work with tcp, udp
--is-invalid Log traffic as invalid. No
effect on actual traffic.
false
--host Host to send to IP or domain name
--port Port to send to/listen on Port number 0-65535
--listen Listen on given port rather
than initiating connection
false
--delay Delay in seconds between
sends
>=0.0s 1.0
--echo Echo received packet data
back to sender rather than ran-
dom
false
--size Size of packet data to send Number of bytes to send Random
--output Log to given file file name stdout
E.2.3.1 Validation.
Validation is done manually on this tool by capturing the generated traffic on both
the sending and receiving hosts. The generator logs the modification(s) it makes to each
packet, so a comparison between the received packet and the replayed packet quickly
confirms each modification works as expected. Modifications are checked individually
and in combination.
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E.2.3.2 Limitations.
Due to the design of the test network, with a switch connecting the hosts, it is
difficult for this tool to reliably sniff traffic (it does not attempt to ARP spoof or otherwise
redirect traffic flow). To compensate for this the malicious generators are run on the
gateways themselves, allowing them to see all of the traffic passing the gateway. A more
realistic solution would be to use a true hub (the test network’s switch did not allow this
configuration) or sniff on a spanning port and send via a separate port.
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Appendix F: Results Processor
After every test run, a custom utility processes the pcap and log files into a single
database and extracts statistics from there. This appendix documents the usage of this tool
and its operation. Section F.2 covers the required packages to process runs. Section F.3
covers usage of the results processor. Section F.4 documents the operation of the processor.
F.1 Validation
Validation is done manually on this tool via short, extremely low-traffic test runs. By
performing tests with only a few packets in each direction, it is possible to manually ensure
that all results the processor produces are accurate. These validation tests are done on
everything from single-flow tests (one direction between just two hosts) and many-flow,
multi-protocol tests.
F.2 Environment
The test processor runs on Ubuntu 12.04, Ubuntu 12.10, and Mac OSX 10.8. Other
versions and distributions are untested, although they may work if the below requirements
are met.
The following packages must be available for process run.py to run:
• Python 2.7
• python-scapy >=2.2.0
• python-libpcap >=0.6.2
In Ubuntu:
1 $ sudo apt-get install python-libpcap python-scapy
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F.3 Usage
process run.py supports a variety of parameters, all of which are optional. The full
parameter list and defaults are given in Table F.1. Full descriptions of each are given in the
list below.
Table F.1: process run.py command-line parameters
Parameter Short Default
--help -h
--logdir -l ‘.’
--database -db In-memory
--empty-database false
--skip-processing false
--skip-stats false
--offset 0
--start-offset 0
--end-offset 0
--show-cycles false
--finish-indicator none
• --help - Display usage message.
• --logdir, -l - Path of directory with log and pcap files.
• --database, -db - Path to database of processed run data. Will be created if needed,
otherwise existing data will be used. If the database is only partially processed,
process run.py will complete it. If not given, defaults to an entirely in-memory
database.
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• --empty-database - If given, all existing data in database is removed.
• --skip-processing - Do not attempt to process data, only produce results. If the
database is incomplete, nothing will happen.
• --skip-stats - Do not calculate statistics after processing run data.
• --offset - Number of seconds to ignore at the beginning and end of a run.
• --start-offset - Number of seconds to ignore at beginning of run. Overrides
value of --offset.
• --end-offset - Number of seconds to ignore at end of run. Overrides value of
--offset.
• --show-cycles - If processing errors occur and the processor generates loops in
the packet chains (i.e., following the next hop for each packet eventually would lead
back around), show cycles may reveal the problem packet(s). Mostly obsolete.
• --finish-indicator - File to create after processing is complete. Intended for
automation.
F.3.1 Example.
The most common use case, when the caller wants to process the run data in the current
directory and create a database named run.db with the results:
1 ˜/results/basic-t0-l20-hr500ms -2012-11-24-08:54:21$ \
process_run.py -db run.db
If a run takes several seconds to enter a steady state, it may be beneficial to ignore
the first 30 seconds of the run. In addition, this example does its work from a different
directory but leaves the results in the same location as the previous example:
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1 ˜/results$ process_run.py -l \
basic-t0-l20-hr500ms -2012-11-24-08:54:21 -db \
basic-t0-l20-hr500ms -2012-11-24-08:54:21/run.db \
--start-offset 30
F.4 Processor Execution
Run processing follows the steps below. It makes assumptions about the test network
to determine where packets are headed and what hosts actually send and receive them, so
logs must come from a network set up as documented in Figure 4.2.
1. Create database.
2. Read run settings from log files and file names.
3. Check settings for test setup problems, such as missing hosts.
4. Read through each PCAP file, entering every packet into the database with a hash of
its data.
5. Read through each log file. For each send/receive/transformation (gateways passing
a packet to/from their inside network) line:
(a) Determine the single-hop source and destination of the packet (who sent it and
which system should see it next).
(b) Determine the true sender and receiver of packet. That is, who originally sent
the packet and for whom it is intended.
(c) Determine if it is intended to be a “valid” packet (i.e., should it reach its
destination or not?).
(d) Locate the packet in the database via hash and record the log information in the
record.
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(e) If it is a transformation packet (at a gateway), locate the send and receive
packets and link them together.
6. Trace packets through the network, creating a chain of sends and receives. Packets
that pass through the gateway follow the transformation through. That is, if the
gateway receives a packet, alters it, and sends it out the other side, the packet
sequence continues unbroken.
7. Check for packet cycles, which would indicate a tracing problem.
8. Copy true source and destination of each packet chain into all packets in the
sequence. When a host sends a packet, it has an intended recipient. This information
is copied into each packet in the chain, making it easier to look up.
9. Locate packet chain terminations. Each packet in a chain is given the ID number of
the packet that ends the chain, allowing the processor to tell where each packet ended
and if it reached the intended destination.
10. Produce statistics by querying the database for packets matching various criteria,
such as packets that terminate at a different destination than intended.
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and S. Molnár. A novel scheme to interconnect multiple frequency
hopping channels into an ad hoc network. SIGMOBILE Mobile Computer
Communication Rev., 8:109–124, January 2004.
[MMPR11] D. M’Raihi, S. Machani, M. Pei, and J. Rydell. TOTP: Time-Based One-Time
Password Algorithm. RFC 6238 (Informational), May 2011.
100
[MPS+02] J. Michalski, C. Price, E. Stanton, E. Lee, CHUA, K. Seah, Yip Heng, TAN,
and C. Pheng. Final report for the network security mechanisms utilizing
network address translation ldrd project. Technical Report SAND2002-3613,
Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, New Mexico, 11 2002.
[Nar04] T. Narten. Assigning Experimental and Testing Numbers Considered Useful.
RFC 3692 (Best Current Practice), January 2004.
[NV09] A.A. Neto and M. Vieira. Untrustworthiness: A trust-based security
metric. In Risks and Security of Internet and Systems (CRiSIS), 2009 Fourth
International Conference on, pages 123–126, Oct. 2009.
[Pos81] J. Postel. Transmission Control Protocol. RFC 793 (Standard), September
1981. Updated by RFCs 1122, 3168, 6093, 6528.
[Ram99] B. Ramsdell. S/MIME Version 3 Message Specification. RFC 2633 (Proposed
Standard), June 1999. Obsoleted by RFC 3851.
[Rep08] K. A. Repik. Defeating Adversary Network Intelligence Efforts with Active
Cyber Defense Techniques. Master’s thesis, Air Force Institute of Technology,
Fairborn, OH, June 2008.
[RT10] B. Ramsdell and S. Turner. Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions
(S/MIME) Version 3.2 Message Specification. RFC 5751 (Proposed
Standard), January 2010.
[Sha49] C.E. Shannon. Communication theory of secrecy systems. Bell system
technical journal, 28(4):656–715, 1949.
[SK02] R. Song and L. Korba. Review of network-based approaches for privacy. In
Proceedings of the 14th Annual Canadian Information Technology Security
Symposium. National Research Council Canada, May 2002.
[SSH05] M. Sifalakis, S. Schmid, and D. Hutchison. Network address hopping: a
mechanism to enhance data protection for packet communications. In ICC
2005. IEEE International Conference on Communications, volume 3, pages
1518–152, May 2005.
[SWLX02] J. Sjoberg, M. Westerlund, A. Lakaniemi, and Q. Xie. Real-Time Transport
Protocol (RTP) Payload Format and File Storage Format for the Adaptive
Multi-Rate (AMR) and Adaptive Multi-Rate Wideband (AMR-WB) Audio
Codecs. RFC 3267 (Proposed Standard), June 2002. Obsoleted by RFC 4867.
[Tal12] D. Talbot. A bandwidth breakthrough. MIT Technology Review, Oct 2012.
[WL03] W. Weinstein and J. Lepanto. Camouflage of network traffic to resist attack
(CONTRA). In DARPA Information Survivability Conference and Exposition,
2003. Proceedings, volume 2, pages 126–127, april 2003.
101
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form ApprovedOMB No. 0704–0188
The public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and
maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including
suggestions for reducing this burden to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704–0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway,
Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202–4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection
of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.
1. REPORT DATE (DD–MM–YYYY) 2. REPORT TYPE 3. DATES COVERED (From — To)
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5a. CONTRACT NUMBER
5b. GRANT NUMBER
5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER
5d. PROJECT NUMBER
5e. TASK NUMBER
5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER
6. AUTHOR(S)
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT
NUMBER
9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S ACRONYM(S)
11. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S REPORT
NUMBER(S)
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:
a. REPORT b. ABSTRACT c. THIS PAGE
17. LIMITATION OF
ABSTRACT
18. NUMBER
OF
PAGES
19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER (include area code)
Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8–98)
Prescribed by ANSI Std. Z39.18
27–03–2013 Master’s Thesis Oct 2011–Mar 2013
Evaluating the Effectiveness of IP Hopping via an Address Routing
Gateway
Morehart, Ryan A., Second Lieutenant, USAF
Air Force Institute of Technology
Graduate School of Engineering and Management (AFIT/EN)
2950 Hobson Way
WPAFB, OH 45433-7765
AFIT-ENG-13-M-35
INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK
12. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT
DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A.
APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES
This work is declared a work of the U.S. Government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States.
14. ABSTRACT
This thesis explores the viability of using Internet Protocol (IP) address hopping in front of a network as a defensive
measure. This research presents a custom gateway-based IP hopping solution called Address Routing Gateway (ARG)
that acts as a transparent IP address hopping gateway. This thesis tests the overall stability of ARG, the accuracy of
its classifications, the maximum throughput it can support, and the maximum rate at which it can change IPs and still
communicate reliably.
This research is accomplished on a physical test network with nodes representing the types of hosts found on a typical,
corporate-style network. Direct measurement is used to obtain all results for each factor level. Tests demonstrate
ARG classifies traffic correctly, with no false negatives and less than a 0.15% false positive rate on average. The test
environment conservatively shows this to be true as long as the IP address change interval exceeds two times the
network’s round-trip latency; real-world deployments may allow for more frequent hopping. Results show ARG capably
handles traffic of at least four megabits per second with no impact on packet loss. Fuzz testing validates the stability of
ARG itself, although additional packet loss of around 23% appears when under attack.
15. SUBJECT TERMS
Networks, address space randomization, IP hopping, routing
U U U UU 116
Dr. Barry E. Mullins
(937) 255-3636 ext. 7979
